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The Supreme Court's decision in Herring v. United States authorizes
police to defeat the Fourth Amendment's protections through a process we
call evidence laundering. Evidence laundering occurs when one police
officer makes a constitutional mistake when gathering evidence and then
passes that evidence along to a second officer, who develops it further and
then delivers it to prosecutors for use in a criminal case. The original
constitutional taint disappears in the wash.
Courts have allowed evidence laundering in a variety of contexts, from
cases involving flawed databases to cases stemming from faulty judgments
and communication lapses in law enforcement teams. Courts typically zero
in on individual officer behavior, or limit their review to a single incident,
rather than considering the entire course of conduct. In so doing, they make
visible the individualistic view of police work that is implicit in much of
Fourth Amendment doctrine. This atomistic perspective, however, fails to
appreciate the realities of modern policing, which depends heavily on
teamwork and delegation. At the same time, the increased emphasis on
police intentions and on balancing the costs and benefits of exclusion
brings our courts into closer alignment with courts elsewhere in the world.
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INTRODUCTION
The exclusionary rule in the United States calls on judges to sort the
dirty laundry in the government's case and to exclude from criminal trials
evidence that the police obtain through constitutional violations. The U.S.
Supreme Court, however, has grown skeptical-particularly during the
Roberts Court era-about the exclusionary rule that it created over a
century ago.' As a result, the Court has crafted several doctrines to limit the
relief available to defendants.2 Those limiting doctrines, taken together,
I See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (expanding good faith exception to
exclusionary rule); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (same); Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (broadening attenuation exception to limit reach of
exclusionary rule); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (establishing exclusionary
rule in federal courts). The Court's opinion in Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016),
appeared after the completion of the research, writing, and principal editorial process for this
article. We do not address its significance here, but view it as a continuation of the Court's
long-term skepticism.
2 Justice Brennan famously declared in his dissent to United States v. Leon that he was
already a witness to "the Court's gradual but determined strangulation of the rule." 468 U.S.
897, 928-29 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Academic commentary on this trend in the
years since Leon is broad and pervasive. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United
States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463 (2009); Morgan Cloud, A
Conservative House United: How the Post-Warren Court Dismantled the Exclusionary Rule,
10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 477 (2013); Sharon L. Davies & Anna B. Scanlon, Katz in the Age of
Hudson v. Michigan: Some Thoughts on "Suppression as a Last Resort," 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1035 (2008); George M. Dery, III, Good Enough for Government Work: The Court's
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amount to more than an exception here or there and result in more than just
a few extra wins for the government in close cases. The long-term doctrinal
trend has transformed the expectations of courts and police officers, as well
as the plausible attorney arguments that form the backdrop for plea
negotiations.3
In this Article, we look closely at one such limiting doctrine and
explain how it reflects long-term trends for criminal procedure remedies.
The cases that interest us here apply the "good faith exception" to the
exclusionary rule in multi-officer situations.4 In these instances, one police
officer makes a constitutional mistake when gathering evidence and then
passes that evidence along to a second officer, who develops it further and
then delivers it to prosecutors for use in a criminal case. When courts admit
the evidence based on the good faith of the second officer, the original
constitutional taint disappears; the second law enforcement agent's limited
knowledge of the original violation effectively launders the evidence.
We begin our assessment of evidence laundering by reviewing the
Supreme Court opinion that first authorized this practice: Herring v. United
Dangerous Decision, in Herring v. United States, to Limit the Exclusionary Rule to Only the
Most Culpable Police Behavior, 20 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1 (2009); Wayne R. LaFave,
The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Latest Assault on the Exclusionary .
Rule, 99 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757 (2009); Tracey Maclin & Jennifer Rader, No More
Chipping Away: The Roberts Court Uses an Axe to Take out the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 81 Miss. L.J. 1183 (2012); James J. Tomkovicz, Hudson v. Michigan
and the Future ofFourth Amendment Exclusion, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1819 (2008).
3 It has also left some courts uncertain about how to conduct suppression analysis in a
"rational and predictable manner" when relying entirely on cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g.,
United States v. Thomas, No. 08-cr-87-bbc-02, 2009 WL 151180, at *8 (W.D. Wis. Jan.
20, 2009).
4 The "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule sometimes applies after a trial court
has made a finding of improper search or seizure by police. Under its terms, even though
police officers clearly violate the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in collecting
evidence, the trial court allows the government to introduce the evidence at trial (ignoring
the usual exclusionary rule) because the circumstances indicate that the officers acted in
"good faith." See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923-24.
5 See United States v. Woerner, 709 F.3d 527, 533-35 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming trial
court's denial of motion to suppress evidence obtained by FBI search warrant that was based
on confession illegally obtained by state police); United States v. Campbell, 603 F.3d 1218,
1229-30 (10th Cir. 2010) (affirming denial of motion to suppress when flaws in affidavit
used to obtain warrant resulted from officers' negligence, not recklessness or deliberate
intent to deceive); State v. Geiter, 942 N.E.2d 1161, 1165-67 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010)
(affirming decision not to exclude evidence obtained from an illegal traffic stop when the
officer conducting the stop "had no reason to question the reliability" of information relayed
via police dispatch).
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6States. As we describe in Part I, the Herring Court took three steps to
extend the good faith exception, making evidence laundering possible.
First, the Court stretched the good faith exception, which had previously
applied only to mistakes by government agents who were not members of
the law enforcement "team," to cover mistakes by other law enforcement
agents. Second, the Court imposed a heightened mental state requirement
on proof of officer misconduct, declaring that simple negligence by a police
officer, regardless of the context, would not be enough to trigger the
exclusionary rule. Third, the Court compartmentalized the relevant actions
of each individual officer, rather than scrutinizing the behavior of the whole
law enforcement team.9
In Part II we show more specifically how Herring invited evidence
laundering by police and laid the groundwork for judicial approval of this
practice. Using a hypothetical case, we first consider the behavior of the
police actor who makes the initial mistake, along with the actions of his or
her colleague who receives the tainted evidence. We then explain how
Herring-by rhetoric and by example-teaches lower courts to turn a blind
eye to evidence laundering except when two officers make egregious
mistakes in the field as they pursue a suspect.
State courts and lower federal courts have walked through the
doctrinal door that the Herring opinion left open. We consider in Part III
the actual results when prosecutors ask for admission of laundered evidence
under the good faith doctrine. Using the results of a Westlaw search, we
show how courts across the country have ruled on evidence laundering in
cases involving law enforcement databases (vehicle information,
outstanding arrest warrants, and DNA) and direct communications between
officers. Most often, courts focus on individual officer behavior or limit
their review to a single incident rather than considering the entire course of
conduct. This disturbing trend is most common in cases arising from errors
in law enforcement databases.10 In those cases, judges have difficulty
identifying the person who inputted the incorrect information and tend to
reflexively assert the reliability of databases, instead of examining the
quality control systems of those databases.'
6 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
Id. at 142-44.
8 Id. at 144-45.
9 Id. at 145-46; see infra Part I.
10 See infra Part III.
I See infra Part III.
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Following our review of the post-Herring cases, we reflect on the
implications of this line of jurisprudence. In Part IV, we argue that the good
faith doctrine, as expanded through a broad reading of Herring, makes
visible the individualistic view of police work that is implicit in much of
Fourth Amendment doctrine. Courts rely on an economic model of the
individual rational actor, which predicts how the rational police officer
might respond to the incentives of exclusion.12 Policing, however, is a
social activity. 13 The atomistic perspective built into Fourth Amendment
doctrine (and most especially the good faith doctrine) fails to appreciate the
interactions among different police officers and organizational units.
The evidence laundering cases make clear that an effective
exclusionary rule must take an organizational perspective on police work.
In the world of fragmented policing1 4 that we glimpse through the window
of these cases, organizational theory tells us more than micro-economic
theory. In particular, those who design and control the flow of information
among policing organizations should, like the officers who react to
information in a particular case, come under constitutional scrutiny.
Perhaps in recognition of this point, the Herring opinion did mention that
"systemic negligence" could result in exclusion.15 Yet the rigors of
assembling evidence to support a single defendant's motion to exclude
evidence, together with the limited reach of criminal discovery, make the
claim difficult to prove.' 6
One consequence of the Court's focus on the conduct of individual
officers is to make jurisdictional boundaries more important. Under the
emboldened post-Herring reading of the good faith doctrine, it becomes
easier for officers from one jurisdiction to sanitize tainted evidence by
passing it along to colleagues in another jurisdiction.17 Herring thus seems
12 See Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 n.4 (describing the exclusion of the evidence weighed
against substantial social costs).
13 See generally EDWARD R. MAGUIRE, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN
POLICE AGENCIES: CONTEXT, COMPLEXITY, AND CONTROL 69-112 (2003) (describing a
"primitive theory" of police organizational structure).
14 See Hadar Aviram et al., Moving Targets: Placing the Good Faith Doctrine in the
Context of Fragmented Policing, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709, 726 (2010) (discussing
fragmented policing and issues with accountability).
15 555 U.S. at 144.
16 Cf United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (establishing difficult showing
for criminal defendant to make before obtaining discovery of government files to explore
allegations of racial bias in selection of charges).
See United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 253-57 (4th Cir. 2012); State v. Brock, 91
So. 3d 1003, 1007 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
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to have reinstituted the silver platter doctrine that the Supreme Court
rejected decades ago.18 The return of the doctrine is especially concerning
today because investigations increasingly occur in joint federal-state task
forces or across state borders.19
Also in Part IV we evaluate the role of evidence laundering within the
political economy of the exclusionary rule. Some observers have noted that
a more flexible exclusionary remedy might give judges the political cover
20they need to declare more vigorous legal limits on law enforcement.
These predictions, however, have not proven accurate. Although the
exclusionary rule transformed slowly over the years into a more flexible
balancing enterprise, the substantive limits on police investigations did not
appear to strengthen in response.
The final implication that we explore in Part IV is comparative. We
suggest that the evidence laundering technique, like so many other changes
to criminal procedure remedies in the United States, brings our courts into
closer alignment with courts elsewhere in the world. While new in the U.S.,
the courts' emphasis on police intentions and on the context in which
violations occur has long been common in other nations. As the
exclusionary rule doctrine in the U.S. converges with its counterparts in
other parts of the world, comparative work can provide us with useful
insights as we attempt to anticipate future doctrinal developments and to
measure the effects of the exclusionary rule.2 1
I. THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION, THEN AND Now
The original pronouncement of a good faith exception to the
18 The silver platter doctrine would allow law enforcement agents in one jurisdiction to
obtain evidence illegally and then present it on a "silver platter" to prosecutors in another
jurisdiction for use in those courts, even if the original police action violated the applicable
law in the jurisdiction where the case was filed. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
208 n.2 (1960).
19 See David Gray et al., The Supreme Court's Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 91
TEx. L. REv. 7, 38-39 (2012); Wayne A. Logan, Dirty Silver Platters: The Enduring
Challenge of Intergovernmental Investigative Illegality, 99 IOWA L. REv. 293, 324-27
(2013).
20 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111,
112-13 (2003); Richard E. Myers II, Fourth Amendment Small Claims Court, 10 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 567, 585-95 (2013); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal
Justice, 119 HARV. L. REv. 781, 793 (2006) ("The government pays for criminal procedure
rules in the coin of forgone arrests and convictions.").
21 Cf Christopher Slobogin, The Exclusionary Rule: Is It on Its Way Out? Should It Be?,
10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 341, 354-55 (2013).
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exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon 22 carried within it the seeds for
growth in many different directions. Even so, the degree to which the Court
has strayed from the original, warrant-based context of good faith in just
twenty-five years is remarkable.23
A. GOOD FAITH THEN
Leon involved a police officer who relied on the judgment of a
magistrate who issued a search warrant that was subsequently invalidated.24
After finding fault with the magistrate's assessment of probable cause, the
Supreme Court considered whether the evidence obtained as a result of the
unconstitutional search should be suppressed.25 In focusing on remedy
rather than on violation, the Court asked if it was reasonable for the officer
to rely on the magistrate's judgment.2 6 Justice White gave this answer: "We
conclude that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing
evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently
invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of
exclusion." 2 7
The Leon majority stressed the role of the judicial officer in producing
the constitutional error.2 8 So long as officers rely on "neutral and detached"
judges for guidance on how to develop their evidence, a cost-benefit
calculation supports the government's use of the evidence at trial, the Court
declared. 2 9 That basic line of reasoning held firm in Illinois v. Krull3 0 and
Arizona v. Evans,3 1 when officers relied on, respectively, a statute that was
22 468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984).
23 Justice Brennan in his Leon dissent predicted this unraveling, as he lamented the day
the Court would use good faith to validate "situations in which the police have conducted a
warrantless search solely on the basis of their own judgment about the existence of probable
cause and exigent circumstances." Id. at 959 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As we describe
below, this prediction has already come true in courts that have taken the broadest reading of
Herring. See, e.g., United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2014).
24 Leon, 468 U.S. at 900.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 922.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 913-14 (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964)).
30 480 U.S. 340, 359-60 (1987) (finding there should be no exclusion if police officer
reasonably relies on a statute later declared unconstitutional).
31 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995) (finding there should be no exclusion if erroneous information
on which police rely resulted from clerical errors of a court employee, as opposed to a law
enforcement employee).
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later invalidated and an inaccurate court record that incorrectly showed an
outstanding arrest warrant. The Court decided that the Leon good faith
exception applied in both of these contexts for two reasons: (1) neither
legislators nor court clerks had any incentive to promote improper searches,
and (2) where officers behave appropriately, there is nothing to deter.32
When police officers pursue an investigation based on faulty evidence
from other law enforcement officers, however, the arguments for allowing
the officer to rely on that evidence become weaker. Law enforcement
employees are all part of the law enforcement community, a group meant to
be constrained by constitutional requirements and deterred by the exclusion
of tainted evidence. For that reason, the Court in Leon, Krull, and Evans
made much of the distinction between state actors who are "adjuncts to the
law enforcement team engaged in the often-competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime" 33 and state actors who hold other, non-law enforcement
roles and thus "have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal
"34prosecutions.
The Leon good faith doctrine also implied that exclusion was premised
on officer negligence; the defense did not need to prove the officer's
subjective awareness of wrongdoing in order to keep tainted evidence out
of the criminal trial. While the Leon Court did not explicitly hold that
negligence by an officer would defeat good faith, its opinion stressed that
the officer's claim to good faith reliance on the behavior or judgment of
others had to be "objectively" reasonable.35 In the years since, lower courts
have emphasized that negligent conduct is the antithesis of objective
reasonableness, 36 thus reinforcing the view that neither intentional
32 Leon, 468 U.S. at 919; see Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141-42 (2009).
33 Evans, 514 U.S. at 15.
34 Id.
35 468 U.S. at 926. This insistence on objective reasonableness is consistent with the
Court's jurisprudence on probable cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
Arguably the need for objective reasonableness should be even greater in the exclusion
context, since that inquiry occurs only after the trial court has found a Constitutional
violation occurred. That is, during the remedy phase of a suppression hearing the burden is
on the government to provide reasons for the behavior of officers who have just been found
to have acted illegally.
36 See, e.g., United States v. DeLeon-Reyna, 898 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd en banc
930 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that where officer fails to follow office
policy when communicating license plate to dispatch and she provides the wrong
information as a result, this is officer negligence, which is by definition not objective
reasonableness within the meaning of Leon); State v. Allen, 690 N.W.2d 582 (Neb. 2005)
(holding that negligence by definition is failure to do something a reasonably careful person
would do under the circumstances).
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wrongdoing nor conscious recklessness by an officer was necessary to
secure exclusion of tainted evidence. Negligence alone would-and did-
suffice.
B. GOOD FAITH NOW
The twenty-first century brought major changes to the law of good
faith. We have witnessed the erosion of the dividing line between law
enforcement and other state actors, the removal of simple negligence from
the exclusion calculus, and the willingness of courts to focus on isolated
moments of police behavior rather than the entire course of the
investigation.3 7 Consequently, today's Supreme Court accepts evidence
gathered by law enforcement practices that were previously seen as off
limits.
While Leon's emphasis on the non-law enforcement status of the
wrongdoer guided the Court in Krull and Evans, the distinction between
law enforcement and non-law enforcement errors no longer seems salient.
This change appeared seven years ago in Herring v. United States, when the
Court held for the first time that good faith could cure even errors made by
law enforcement officers.38 Specifically, Herring held that the exclusionary
rule does not apply when an illegal search is based on "isolated [police]
negligence attenuated from the arrest." 3 9 In Herring, a police officer
obtained a faulty report (created by a records clerk in the sheriffs office of
another county) about an expired arrest warrant for Bennie Dean Herring. 40
The officer enforced what he believed (incorrectly) to be a valid
outstanding warrant and arrested Herring; the search incident to arrest
turned up methamphetamine and an illegal pistol.4 1 The search was illegal
because there was no probable cause for the arrest and the warrant had
expired, so the evidence obtained should have been excluded from
42Herring's case. But according to the Herring Court, "the exclusionary rule
serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some
3 The Court has also expanded good faith protection to officers who rely on binding
circuit precedent that is later declared unconstitutional. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
2419 (2011).
38 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).
39 Id. at 137. While the Court's statement specified "arrest," the holding applies to any
police action. The arrest language derives from the factual circumstances of Herring.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 138.
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circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.'A 3 It does not apply outside
that context.
Once the Herring opinion made it possible to salvage illegal searches
that began and ended with law enforcement actors, the critical question
changed. It was no longer enough for a court to ask the institutional home
of the actor who made the initial error in the search. Now it became
important to learn about the distance that separated the first (erroneously
acting) police officer from any later officers. Herring thus tied together two
different doctrinal threads, extending the reach of the "attenuation" doctrine
to make it relevant to good faith analysis." As a result, good faith now
resembles other limitations on the exclusionary rule that rest on the causal
link between the original source of the error and the proposed use of the
-45
evidence.
We cannot be sure if the basis for attenuation under the Herring
doctrine is temporal (that the arrest occurred five months after the error),
spatial (that the arrest occurred in a different jurisdiction from the source of
the error) or personal (that someone other than the arresting officer was
responsible for the faulty record keeping).46 Whichever the meaning, the
attenuation concept suggests that when the primary investigating officer is
removed in some way from the error, deterrence of future misconduct is
both less likely to result and too costly to impose.4 7 The most important
aspect of attenuation in the Herring opinion, for our purposes, extends good
faith protection through personal attenuation-situations where the
43 Id. at 144.
See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
45 On this basis, courts admit tainted evidence that is removed (by time and intervening
event) from the original illegality, or because they believe such evidence would have been
inevitably discovered through lawful police channels. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431
(1984); Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491; see also Cloud, supra note 2 (discussing the
interconnected natures of the doctrines).
46 For a fuller discussion of the ambiguity of attenuation in the Herring opinion, see
LaFave, supra note 2, at 771-72 (discussing six potential meanings of "attenuated").
47 Some commentators have suggested that the attenuation qualifier in Herring was
added only to secure a fifth vote for the majority and that it may well be dropped in the near
future. Craig M. Bradley, Red Herring or the Death of the Exclusionary Rule?, 45 TRIAL 52,
53 (2009); LaFave, supra note 2, at 760 n.18 (citing Richard McAdams, Herring and the
Exclusionary Rule, UNIV. OF CHI. FACULTY BLOG (Jan. 17, 2009, 00:06 AM),
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2009/01/herring-and-the-exclusionary-rule.html);
Tom Goldstein, The Surpassing Significance of Herring, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 14, 2009,
11:32 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/01/the-surpassing-significance-of-herring
(discussing how the "attenuated" issue is not looked at or taken seriously).
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offending officer is not the same as the subsequent officer who receives
tainted evidence.48
In addition to expanding the types of actors who could benefit from
good faith protection and adapting the attenuation doctrine to fit the good
faith context, the Herring opinion also made a far-reaching change to the
standard for judging the culpability of police officers.49 It jettisoned the
simple negligence standard that was at the heart of the Leon opinion. The
Herring opinion instead used various formulations to describe the type of
police wrongdoing that would suffice to justify suppression: "flagrant"
violations, "knowledge" that the search was unconstitutional, "intentional
conduct that was patently unconstitutional."5 In short, the Court held:
[P]olice conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter
it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice
system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate,
reckless, or rossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic
negligence.
In the absence of this heightened mental state, the Court said,
48 For the remainder of our analysis, we assume attenuation in this instance was
primarily personal, rather than spatial or temporal, as that seems the most likely reading of
Herring v. United States on its facts. Justice Ginsburg in her dissent declared that the fact
that the error occurred "in Dale County rather than Coffee:County is inconsequential in the
suppression analysis." 555 U.S. at 150 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This may track the
Court's longstanding rejection of the silver platter doctrine. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 208-11 (1960). However, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized the spatial
dimension of attenuation when it issued its opinion, commenting that exclusion would
inappropriately "scuttle a case brought by officers of a different department in another
county." United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212, 1218 (11th Cir. 2007).
49 Others have heavily criticized the Court for crafting this heightened mental state
requirement in the name of deterrence. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 2, at 483-84
(suggesting that Chief Justice Roberts "may have forgotten what he learned in law school"
about subjective and objective standards because the Court declared the mental state of
police officers relevant to a standard it described as objective); Thomas K. Clancy, The
Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment in the Roberts Court, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 191, 203-
04 (2010) (discussing a broad reading of the opinion that would "expand dramatically the
inapplicability of the exclusionary rule"); LaFave, supra note 2, at 772-74 (focus on
negligence of individual officers would cut "a wide swath through the exclusionary rule").
so See Herring, 555 U.S. at 142-44. Ironically, Herring's embrace of subjectivity as the
true test for constitutional violations contradicts the Court's assessment of subjectivity in
cases like Whren v. United States; in Whren, the Court asserted that a focus on the officer's
subjective mental state would produce unreliable and inconsistent results and would invite
perjury. 517 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1996). We thank Morgan Cloud, a colleague of one of the
authors, for bringing this point to our attention during his review of the manuscript of this
article.
51 Herring, 555 U.S. at 144.
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exclusion of highly relevant evidence seems unfair to those police officers
who do follow the law.52 Moreover, the Court asserted that only officers or
departments who act according to this heightened mental state could be
deterred by exclusion.53 For those reasons, the Court argued, exclusion
should be limited to cases in which serious concerns about officer
culpability are present.
The Court in Herring used conflicting language to describe whether
this inquiry into the officer's culpability is subjective or purely objective.54
At one point the Court suggested that a trial judge must determine the
subjective mental state of the officer who violated the law, in an effort to
determine whether that mental state triggers the exclusionary remedy:
"[T]he exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent conduct . . .. Likewise, the majority asserted that, "[W]hen
police mistakes are the result of negligence . . . rather than systemic error or
reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence
does not 'pay its way."' 5 6 But at another point in the opinion the Court
insisted that:
The pertinent analysis of deterrence and culpability is objective, not an "inquiry into
the subjective awareness of arresting officers[.]" ... [O]ur good-faith inquiry is
confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained
officer would have known that the search was illegal" in light of "all of the
circumstances. 5 7
While the first two statements signal that officer intent matters because
deliberate or reckless misconduct is the only sound basis for exclusion, this
last statement renders the subjective mental state of the individual officers
irrelevant.
52 This issue of the unfairness of excluding evidence obtained by one person based on
mistakes made by another person has run through the entire line of Leon cases. But as
Justice Brennan argued in Leon v. United States, this conception of fairness equates
deterrence with punishment of individuals, when the whole point of deterrence through
exclusion is "to promote institutional compliance with Fourth Amendment requirements on
the part of law enforcement agencies generally." 468 U.S. 897, 953 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
53 Herring, 555 U.S. at 143-44.
54 See id.
55 Id. at 144.
56 Id. at 147-48 (citation omitted).
Id. at 145 (emphasis added) (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, Herring v.
United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (No. 07-513)); Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23 (1984).
58 Justice Ginsburg highlighted this discrepancy in her Herring dissent; she accused the
majority of not clearly "squar[ing] its focus on deliberate conduct with its recognition that
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Whether objective or subjective, precisely which government agents
must display this level of culpability? Three groups of government officials
created the unjustified arrest of Bennie Dean Herring. The first was the
arresting officer, Mark Anderson, who worked for the Coffee County
Sheriffs Department: he noticed that Mr. Herring was present at the police
station to retrieve an item from his impounded vehicle. 5 9 Because Mr.
Herring was "no stranger to law enforcement," Deputy Anderson asked the
warrants clerk in his own office to check for any outstanding arrest
warrants.6 0 When the Coffee County clerk found no warrants, Anderson
asked her to check in nearby Dale County.61 The clerk in Dale County (the
second government agent in this scenario) did find a computer record of an
outstanding arrest warrant, but-unbeknownst to her-the record was
faulty because the court had "recalled" the warrant five months earlier. 6 2
Somehow, the routine communication between the Dale County Sheriffs
Department and the court clerk for Dale County (the third agent) broke
down, and an outdated record stayed in the system.63
The Supreme Court's opinion directed attention away from the early
error, showing no particular curiosity about the agents in Dale County: "For
whatever reason, the information about the recall of the warrant for Herring
did not appear in the database." 6 4 The opinion noted only that "there is no
evidence that errors in Dale County's system are routine or widespread."6 5
The majority opinion never mentioned the fact that the state actors did not
routinely audit their system for accuracy, or that Alabama showed a 13%
error rate in its state databases. 66 The Court instead congratulated the Dale
application of the exclusionary rule does not require inquiry into the mental state of the
police." 555 U.S. at 157 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also United States v. De Leon-
Reyna, 898 F.2d 486, 490-91 (5th Cir. 1990) (arguing that the belief that evidence should
not be excluded unless the officer's conduct was dishonest or reckless "ignores the
overwhelming weight of authority which stresses that the officer's belief and conduct must
be objectively reasonable" and stating "[i]t [is] oxymoronic for the government to suggest
that an error made through negligence is 'reasonable').
59 Herring, 555 U.S. at 137.
60 Id
61 Id.
62 Id. at 138
63 Id.
6 Id. (emphasis added).
65 Id. at 147. In making this claim, the Court ignored evidence from amici documenting
that law enforcement databases are "insufficiently monitored and often out of date." Id. at
155 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 154 ("Is it not altogether obvious that the Department could take further
precautions to ensure the integrity of its database?"); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at
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County clerk for informing Coffee County about the error "immediately"
after she learned about the problem. This notification was of course too
late for Mr. Herring, as he had already been arrested and searched.
The opinion also spent little time asking about Coffee County and the
reasonableness of Deputy Anderson's reliance on the information from
Dale County. Where "systemic errors" affect the databases of a law
enforcement agency, "it might be reckless for officers to rely on" that
system, the Court said. 8 But in the absence of evidence that such errors are
systematic, an officer's reliance is well-placed and thus protected by good
faith. The Court assessed the facts here as follows: "The Coffee County
officers did nothing improper" and the clerk showed professionalism by
requesting a faxed confirmation of the warrant, which is what led to the
discovery of the error.69
By conducting this shallow inquiry7o into the source of the error (and
thereby neglecting the likelihood of other errors by these departments), the
Herring Court betrayed the original goal of the good faith exception.71 Leon
emphasized that because the goal of the exception is to deter police
misconduct, the conduct of all of the police officers involved should come
26, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (No. 07-513) (noting the 13% error rate in
Alabama). It is beyond the scope of this article for us to suggest the appropriate level of
confidence courts should have in databases; we merely want to draw attention to the Herring
Court's strong assumption of reliability in the face of contradictory evidence.
67 Herring, 555 U.S. at 138.
68 Id. at 146.
69 Id. at 140, 146.
70 Here we assume the extent of the Court's inquiry is reflected in its opinion. Any
deeper reflections, to the extent they exist, remain hidden from view-both to scholars and
to future courts considering these questions.
Encouraging shallowness in police inquiry is also problematic in the apparent authority
line of cases, in which the Court has held that officers can reasonably rely on the bare
information they are provided when assessing whether a potential consenter has authority
over a private area. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990). Officers can make the claim
of reasonable reliance based on "facts available ... at the moment," even if conducting
further investigation would not be burdensome. Id. While they need to judge assertions of
authority against known circumstantial evidence that such authority does not exist, there is
no due diligence requirement to encourage them to find circumstantial evidence that either
confirms or contradicts the claim of authority.
n See Herring, 555 U.S. at 140-41 ("Leon admonished that we must consider the actions
of all the police officers involved."). The broad approach to police liability that the Court
approved in Leon is premised on, and reinforced by, the collective knowledge doctrine
articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Hensley and Whiteley v. Warden. 469
U.S. 221 (1985); 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
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under scrutiny.72 The Leon Court cautioned that a more cursory approach
would permit officers to use their deliberately ignorant colleagues to do
what they themselves cannot do.73 Hence, the reasonable basis for police
action that is required by Leon "refers to the knowledge and information
possessed by the law enforcement community as a whole" because to
define it otherwise "would affirmatively encourage .. . careless, perhaps
deliberately neglectful [behaviors]."
But after Herring, lower courts might be inclined to eschew the law
enforcement team approach, scrutinizing only the behavior of the officer
who triggered the prosecution. In other words, they might put more stock in
the outcome that Herring endorsed, rather than heed the opinion's mention
of Leon, and its proposal that systemic negligence should defeat good faith.
As long as a trial judge finds that the last officer in the chain "did nothing
improper,"75 he or she might be content to remain in the dark about how the
error happened. This approach, as Fourth Amendment scholar Wayne
LaFave argues, would effectively nullify the collective knowledge
doctrine. Others have said "the Court's 'reasonable mistake' exception to
the exclusionary rule will tend to put a premium on police ignorance of the
law." 7 7
72 Herring, 555 U.S. at 140 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 n.24
(1984) ("It is necessary to consider the objective reasonableness, not only of the officers
who eventually executed a warrant, but also of the officers who originally obtained it or who
provided information material to the probable-cause determination.")).
7 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 n.24.
74 Albo v. State, 477 So. 2d 1071, 1074, 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see People v.
Turnage, 642 N.E.2d 1235, 1240 (Ill. 1994) (refusing to "allow the police to effectively
thwart the constitutional protections provided by the warrant process" by limiting attention
only to the officer who executed a defective warrant).
75 Herring, 555 U.S. at 140.
76 See LaFave, supra note 2, at 773 (discussing the difficulty of fitting all Whiteley
unconscionable decisions into a Herring framework). Arizona v. Evans made clear that
because Whiteley v. Warden was decided at a time when error was equivalent to exclusion,
its precedential value on the issue of exclusion was "dubious," but the collective knowledge
doctrine was not eliminated. 514 U.S. 1, 13 (1995) (citing Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560
(1971)).
Leon, 468 U.S. at 955 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan went on to predict
that:
[Police departments, alrmed with the assurance provided by today's decisions that evidence will
always be admissible whenever an officer has "reasonably" relied upon a warrant, . . . will be
encouraged to train officers that if a warrant has simply been signed, it is reasonable, without
more, to rely on it. Since in close cases there will no longer be any incentive to err on the side of
constitutional behavior, police would have every reason to adopt a "let's-wait-until-it's-decided"
approach in situations in which there is a question about a warrant's validity or the basis for its
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In sum, following Herring, an attenuated police mistake occurs when
the misbehaving officer hands off his file to a second officer.7 8 That second
officer can then use the evidence based on a claim of reasonable reliance if
he does not know of the first officer's mistake. 79 As long as the court is
convinced the error was the result of simple negligence only, personal
attenuation allows the second officer to do what the first officer cannot. We
call this process "evidence laundering."80
II. EVIDENCE LAUNDERING BY DESIGN: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO
ATTENUATED POLICE MISCONDUCT
The evidence laundering scenario involves two officers, from the same
or different departments, who share information in the wake of misconduct
by one of them. The second officer gathers evidence based on the tainted
information provided by the misbehaving officer, and uses that new
information to initiate a criminal case against the accused. This Part
describes how Herring makes it possible in this hypothetical scenario for
the second officer to launder the mistakes or wrongdoing of the first officer.
The attenuated misconduct story begins with a law enforcement team
81member, we will call him "Officer Mutt," who makes a mistake. For
issuance.
Id.
78 Some lower courts have extended Herring to the one-officer situation, where the same
officer who makes the mistake conducts the arrest or search that leads to the challenged
evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512, 529-32 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding a
good faith mistake where an officer reasonably relied on his own erroneously obtained
information); see infra Part III.
Of course, if the facts also suggest temporal or spatial dimensions to attenuation, that
improves the government's position on the likelihood and value of deterrence. The temporal
concerns were salient even in the pre-Herring days. See, e.g., State v. Stringer, 372 S.E.2d
426, 428 (Ga. 1988) (explaining that the bench warrant should have been withdrawn twenty-
one months earlier); Albo, 477 So. 2d at 1075 (finding a failure to update police computers
for several months); Carter v. State, 305 A.2d 856, 858 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973)
(discussing that the stolen vehicle report was not rescinded for three months after car was
recovered); cf Childress v. United States, 381 A.2d 614, 617-18 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (tolerating
some "administrative delay" in failure to remove satisfied warrants from urban police
database).
80 See State v. Hicks, 707 P.2d 331, 333 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) ("[p]olice officers cannot
launder their prior unconstitutional behavior by presenting the fruits of it to a magistrate"),
affid on other grounds sub nom. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
Sometimes the errant team member is not a uniformed officer. See, e.g., United States
v. Humbert, 336 F. App'x 132, 135-36 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that even if the
defendant's DNA sample that was obtained by authorities upon his release from prison was
in violation of state law, there was no Fourth Amendment violation when police used a
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example, he arrests a suspect without probable cause, he wrongly enters (or
fails to delete) the suspect's information in a police-maintained database, or
he executes a stale search warrant at the suspect's house. "Officer Jeff' then
enters the scene and has the chance to rehabilitate the case. Rehabilitation is
possible under Herring because Mutt and Jeff communicate in a way that
allows Jeff to deny that he knew or should have known of Mutt's mistake.82
How does this opportunity for rehabilitation occur? Officer Jeff learns
the substance of what Officer Mutt knows about the accused but remains in
the dark about the methods that Officer Mutt used to acquire this
information; in other words, no one directly mentions Officer Mutt's
mistake, if they are even aware of it. Officer Jeff uses the information to
apply for a new warrant or otherwise to justify further contact with the
accused. Armed with a warrant or probable cause, Officer Jeff searches the
suspect's property (or arrests him, or interrogates him) and learns new
information helpful to the prosecution.
When the government files charges, the accused moves to suppress the
evidence that Officer Jeff gathered, claiming this evidence is all fruit of the
poisonous tree-Officer Mutt's error. The prosecution admits the original
error but argues that Officer Jeff s evidence should not properly be
considered fruit of the poisonous tree. Due to the deniability built into the
match derived from it to get a new warrant for a new sample); People v. Robinson, 224 P.3d
55, 68-71 (Cal. 2010) (showing defendant's blood sample taken by jail personnel in
violation of state statute was later used to match defendant to a new crime). Some cases stem
from factual mistakes made by the police dispatcher, who provides incorrect information to
an officer on patrol about a defendant's driver's license or warrant status. See, e.g., United
States v. Groves, 559 F.3d 637, 642 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding no probable cause to arrest
when an officer is told by dispatcher there is a warrant for the defendant, but it is just a
"watch out" bulletin which provides, at most, reasonable suspicion); State v. Handy, 18 A.3d
179, 180 (N.J. 2011); State v. Brock, 91 So. 3d 1003, 1007 (La. Ct. App. 2012). In other
settings, the factual mistake is contained in a police-maintained computer database about
stolen cars or active warrants, on which the patrolman relies when stopping or arresting the
defendant. In these cases, it is usually unclear which employee made the erroneous input.
See, e.g., United States v. Altman, No. 09-CR-20010, 2009 WL 4065047, at *1 & n.1, *3-*4
(C.D. Ill. 2009) (noting warrant was for wrong person; dispatcher who provided incorrect
information worked for a joint city and county communication center); United States v.
Esquivel-Rios, 39 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1188-89 (D. Kan. 2014); McCain v. State, 4 A.3d 53,
64-65 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010); State v. Geiter, 942 N.E.2d 1161, 1166-67 (Ohio Ct. App.
2010).
82 This is the sort of "'working arrangement[]' that would allow circumvention of Fourth
Amendment protections" about which the Court was warned by amici in Herring. See Brief
for National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
28, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (No. 07-513) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 658 (1961)).
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communication between the officers, Officer Jeff did not know of Officer
Mutt's mistake, and thus his good faith behavior insulates the evidence
from the earlier error. In short, the reasonable, good faith reliance of Officer
Jeff on his fellow officer (or on the allegedly reliable police database)
breaks the chain.
The Herring opinion calls for some inquiry into the reasonableness of
Officer Jeff s reliance on the information he received. Did Officer Jeff
actually know, or should he have known, of Officer Mutt's misconduct?
Recall that Herring regards mere negligence as insufficient to trigger
exclusion; instead, systemic negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, or
deliberate intent is required to make exclusion pay its way. Presumably,
more serious errors by Officer Mutt should be harder to launder, because
they would be harder to hide. In other words, the more serious the error
committed by Officer Mutt, the more likely it is Officer Jeff knew about or
had reason to know about it.
Proving that Officer Jeff had actual knowledge of the prior misconduct
may be difficult for a defendant.83 Evidence of malicious or reckless intent
is often hard to come by, especially when officers are testifying under oath.
But in this setting proof of willful blindness 84 is a real possibility." A trial
court should ask a series of questions in this regard: Did Officer Jeff ignore
clues about misconduct? Did Officer Jeff purposely refrain from asking
Officer Mutt important questions that, if answered truthfully, would have
revealed the misconduct? Was Officer Mutt's misconduct so flagrant that
any reasonable officer in Officer Jeff s position must have known of it?
Affirmative answers to any or all of these inquiries suggest proof of willful
blindness.
See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 157 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("How is an impecunious defendant to make the required showing?").
84 In other criminal law settings, willful blindness is morally and factually equated with
knowledge of the misconduct, or at the very least with recklessness. See, e.g., Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068-69 (2011) ("The doctrine of willful
blindness is well established in criminal law.... [C]ourts applying the doctrine [hold] that
defendants cannot escape the reach of... statutes by deliberately shielding themselves from
clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the circumstances."); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) ("[K]nowledge is established if a person is aware of a high
probability of its existence[.]"). A similar analysis applies in the context of money
laundering. See United States v. Nicholson, 176 F. App'x 386 (4th Cir. 2006); United States
v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 2000).
85 See People v. Jennings, 430 N.E.2d 1282, 1285 (N.Y. 1981) (rejecting the "white heart
and empty head standard" that might otherwise sanitize police reliance on mistake made by
fellow officers) (citing James J. White & Robert S. Summers, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
218 (2d ed. 1980)).
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In the absence of malicious intent, the defense may still be able to
establish gross negligence or systemic negligence. The credibility of Officer
Jeff s claim to reasonable reliance depends in part on the professional
reputation of Officer Mutt-for obedience, caution, sloppiness, intentional
flouting of rules, or something in between. It is more believable that Officer
Jeff could remain ignorant about a first-time error of Officer Mutt than
about a continuation of Mutt's persistent carelessness or regular
misconduct.8 6 Moreover, this inquiry might extend beyond individual
reputations. If the officers hail from distinct departments, Officer Jeff may
be on notice if Officer Mutt's department has a reputation for misconduct
or carelessness.
While the Herring opinion recognized the abstract possibility of
denying good faith based on systemic negligence, the Court's factual
analysis creates proof problems for defendants who want to make this
argument. The Herring Court failed to conduct a searching inquiry into the
warrants system maintained by Dale County or by Alabama generally,
choosing instead to gauge good faith based on a shallow assessment of the
Coffee County employees and some platitudes about the Dale County
warrant clerk. In so doing, the Court signaled that its interest in ferreting
out systemic negligence was something less than genuine. Even if courts
were more willing to consider claims of systemic negligence, defendants in
most jurisdictions are likely to face serious legal and practical difficulties in
obtaining evidence to mount such claims.88
In sum, if the trial court finds that Officer Jeff was at most negligent in
his decision to rely on the information provided by Officer Mutt, and if it
fails to identify hard evidence of significant or recurring misconduct by
Officer Mutt, Herring instructs the court to admit the evidence. The original
violation is thus washed away through reasonable reliance on a fellow
officer. To borrow a phrase crafted by the California Supreme Court in the
years before Herring, this type of good faith causes an otherwise defunct
86 The Herring majority itself recognized this tendency, as it suggested that officers
would be reckless for trusting others known for systemic negligence. 555 U.S. at 146.
87 Examples of lower courts following the Supreme Court's analytical techniques appear
in Part III.
88 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (setting high standard for
defense to obtain discovery of potential equal protection violations based on race in
prosecutorial filing decisions in crack cocaine cases). See generally Jonathan Abel, Brady 's
Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files and the Battle Splitting the
Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REv. 743 (2015) (discussing confidentiality of police
personnel files in many jurisdictions).
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case to be "magically resuscitate[d] ... phoenix-like,"89  through the
reliance of one officer upon another officer's silence about his misconduct.
Herring thus rewards a predictable and limited form of communication
among police officers and agencies. 90
III. EVIDENCE OF EVIDENCE LAUNDERING: POST-HERRING CASES
ADJUDICATING TWO-STEP POLICE MISCONDUCT
Herring has now been the law in the United States for seven years.
What have been its effects? How have state courts and lower federal courts
responded to the incentives that Herring created for officers to launder their
mistakes through the attenuation process? When defendants challenge this
two-step handoff, how have the courts responded? How deeply do they dig
into law enforcement practices to determine the sources of error?
The Mutt and Jeff hypothetical we presented in the previous Part
offered a stark example of how courts might inspire evidence laundering if
they follow the acquiescent approach to fault and attenuation suggested by
Herring. In our review of the case law in this Part, we identify courts that
have permitted boldly problematic handoffs of the sort contemplated by the
hypothetical. But even in the less obviously problematic cases, acquiescent
reasoning or insufficient fact-finding by courts suggests a tolerance for
evidence laundering that not only is troubling on its face but might also
inspire evasive tactics by law enforcement in the future.91
To get an early read on the impact of Herring, in 2014 we searched
People v. Ramirez, 668 P.2d 761, 764 (Cal. 1983). California now follows Herring,
pursuant to a state constitutional amendment that requires state law exclusionary rules to
directly track federal rules. Proposition 8, CAL. CONST. article I, § 28(a).
90 See, e.g., State v. Peterson, 830 P.2d 854, 861 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (refusing to allow
police to "exploit[]" errors made by their colleagues); State v. Snee, 743 So. 2d 270, 275-76
(La. Ct. App. 1999) (rewarding a police officer for relying on misconduct of another officer
defeats the intention of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule). See also United
States v. Noster, 590 F.3d 624, 636 (9th Cir. 2009) (Shadur, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority
seeks to transmute base metal into gold[.]"); People v. Joseph, 470 N.E.2d 1303, 1306 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1984) (refusing to allow law enforcement authorities to "rely on an error of their
own making").
91 The ability of a Supreme Court case to create perverse incentives for police is well
known. For example, until the Court put an end to the two-step custodial interrogation,
where Miranda warnings bifurcate an interrogation instead of preceding it, many police
officers took the cues provided by Oregon v. Elstad and gave Miranda to custodial suspects
only after they had already confessed. 470 U.S. 298 (1985); see Missouri v. Seibert, 542
U.S. 600 (2004); see also Charles D. Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse after Dickerson, 99
MICH. L. REv. 1121 (2001) (demonstrating how the Court's various exceptions to Miranda
have led to police training each other how to question outside Miranda).
646 [Vol. 106
EVIDENCE LA UNDERING
Westlaw databases for federal and state cases that applied Herring in the
handoff scenario.92 We conducted two related inquiries: (1) a search for
federal and state cases from 2009-2014 that cite and discuss the Supreme
Court's decision in Herring and particularly mention headnote 8 (the
headnote describing the Court's factual analysis of the handoff procedure);
and (2) a digest search for all federal and state cases from 2009-2014
invoking the key number that describes good faith in this setting.9 3 Our
search turned up twenty-one federal and state cases examining the kind of
attenuated police behavior that was at issue in Herring. Table 1 summarizes
those cases.
Table 1
Evidence Laundering Scenarios in State Courts and Lower Federal Courts
from 2009-2014
Case Name Good Jurisdictions Source of
Faith? Error
Shotts v. State, Yes Two states Arrest
925 N.E.2d 719 (Ind. 2010) Warrant
database
State v. Johnson, Yes One police Arrest
6 So. 3d 195 (La. Ct. App. 2009) department Warrant
database
State v. Brock, Yes Two parishes Arrest
91 So. 3d 1003 (La. Ct. App. 2012) Warrant
database
United States v. Echevarria-Rios, Yes One police Arrest
746 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2014) department Warrant
database
United States v. Smith, Yes Two parishes in Arrest
354 F. App'x 99 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) same state Warrant
database
United States v. Altman, Yes One police Arrest
No. 09-CR-20010, 2009 WL 4065047 (C.D. department Warrant
Ill. Nov. 20, 2009) database
92 An early post-Herring work adopting a similar approach found six cases addressing
the attenuation issue that forms the core of our study. See generally Claire Angelique
Nolasco et al., What Herring Hath Wrought: An Analysis of Post-Herring Cases in the
Federal Courts, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 221, 232-53 (2011) (collecting and analyzing cases that
cite and discuss Herring from January 2009-March 2010).
9 The key number is 110k392.38.
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Case Name Good Jurisdictions Source of
Faith? Error
Domino v. Crowley City Police Dep't, Yes One police Arrest
65 So. 3d 289 (La. Ct. App. 2011) department Warrant
database
Bellamy v. Commonwealth, Yes One police Arrest
724 S.E.2d 232 (Va. Ct. App. 2012) department Warrant
database
United States v. Groves, Yes One police Arrest
559 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 2009) department Warrant
database
People v. Robinson, Yes State DNA
224 P.3d 55 (Cal. 2010) corrections, database
sheriff
United States v. Humbert, Yes State DNA
336 F. App'x 132 (3d Cir. 2009) corrections, FBI database
United States v. Davis, Yes Two counties in DNA
690 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2012) same state database
United States v. Esquivel-Rios, Yes State highway Car




State v. Geiter, Yes One police Stolen
942 N.E.2d 1161 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) department vehicle
database
McCain v. State, Yes State motor Car
4 A.3d 53 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) vehicle records, registration
city police database
United States v. Campbell, Yes One police Search
603 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2010) department warrant
United States v. Woerner, Yes FBI and city Search
709 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 2013) police warrant
State v. Handy, No One police Dispatcher
18 A.3d 179 (N.J. 2011) department mistake
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Case Name Good Jurisdictions Source of
Faith? Error
United States v. Martinez, No One sheriff s Home entry
696 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D.N.M. 2010) office
People v. Arnold, No One sheriffs Arrest
914 N.E.2d 1143 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) office warrant
database
Of the twenty-one cases, we found seventeen cases in which courts
invoked the Herring formula to admit evidence even though it was
laundered through the two-step handoff process. There were four cases in
which courts found deliberate misconduct, recklessness, or gross negligence
sufficient to sustain exclusion.94 Given the vagaries of the search process,
we are confident this does not represent the entire field of post-Herring
cases in the two-step handoff scenario, but it may well embody a fair cross-
section of court activity95 on this issue in the first five years after the
Herring opinion was issued.96 At the very least, we can look to these cases
94 There was one additional case that found misconduct in the two-step handoff scenario
but did not cite Herring; it relied exclusively on state law and other Supreme Court
precedents to conclude that good faith was inapplicable. See State v. Bromm, 819 N.W.2d
231 (Neb. Ct. App. 2012) (noting the officer received erroneous license plate and vehicle
registration from dispatcher and used that information to stop and search a car; mistake
should be attributed to law enforcement team; deterrence is needed in this circumstance to
make team members more careful). Another case identified misconduct by federal DEA
agents in failing to supervise the execution of a warrant but since they all knew of the
misconduct, good faith was unavailable. United States v. Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d
761, 776 n.5 (7th Cir. 2010).
95 Of course, this group of cases does not account for the full impact of Herring because
it only tracks written court decisions. It does not include instances in which motions were
filed but then withdrawn pursuant to a plea agreement; it also does not account for
defendants who were deterred from filing a motion because they assumed that they could not
prove deliberate or reckless or grossly negligent conduct by the officer.
96 There are many other cases in which courts have cited and discussed Herring for its
dicta that the exclusionary rule from this point forward must always pay its way. Hence,
some courts cite Herring for the proposition that only deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent mistakes of any sort should lead to exclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Ponce, 734
F.3d 1225, 1227-29 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding good faith where officer reasonably believed
his canine alert provided sufficient justification for search); United States v. Koch, 625 F.3d
470, 477-78 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding good faith where officers opened flash drive and
discovered pornography); United States v. Alabi, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1262, 1290 (D.N.M.
2013) (finding good faith where officers obtained credit card information without a warrant).
These applications far exceed the boundaries of the "isolated negligence attenuated" from
the original error factual setting of Herring. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137
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to generate examples of how courts handle this issue in recurring factual
settings.
Turning first to the cases that applied Herring to validate the handoff,
the opinions most frequently contain facts that mirror the facts of Herring
itself: a police officer executes an arrest warrant found in a law enforcement
database that later turns out to be invalid or recalled. 9 7 Nine of the
seventeen opinions invoked the good faith exception in this warrant
database scenario. For example, in Bellamy v. Commonwealth, during the
course of a domestic violence investigation the officer asked dispatch to run
a warrant check on the participants." When the dispatcher found an
outstanding warrant for Bellamy, the officer took him into custody,
performed a search incident to arrest, and found a bullet and marijuana in
his pocket.100 The officer later learned that the warrant reported by the
police dispatcher had previously been served.o'0 Citing Herring but offering
little analysis of the facts, the Virginia Court of Appeals asserted that the
officer was objectively reasonable in relying on the dispatcher's report and
declared that the dispatcher's error was not the result of "systemic error or
(2009). That said, some courts that have applied Herring broadly have found deliberate or
reckless misconduct that is worthy of suppression. See, e.g., United States v. Ganias, 755
F.3d 125, 136-37 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding no good faith where government agents exploited
warrant and retained defendant's property for more than two years); United States v. Stokes,
733 F.3d 438, 443-44 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding officer's deliberate entry into the defendant's
hotel room without a warrant or consent justified exclusion); United States v. Williams, 731
F.3d 678, 689-90 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding officer's frisk of defendant in the absence of
reasonable suspicion to be deliberate and culpable to an extent that warrants suppression);
United States v. Taylor, 963 F. Supp. 2d 595, 601-O5 (S.D. W. Va. 2013) (finding the police
department's policy of permeation during traffic stops to be a deliberate violation of the
Fourth Amendment).
97 See, e.g., United States v. Echevarria-Rios, 746 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2014) (arrest warrant
later declared invalid because summons never served); United States v. Smith, 354 F. App'x
99 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Altman, No. 09-CR-20010, 2009 WL 4065047 (C.D.
Ill. Nov. 20, 2009); Shotts v. State, 925 N.E.2d 719 (Ind. 2010); State v. Brock, 91 So. 3d
1003 (La. Ct. App. 2012); Domino v. Crowley City Police Dep't, 65 So. 3d 289 (La. Ct.
App. 2011); State v. Johnson, 6 So. 3d 195 (La. Ct. App. 2009); Bellamy v. Commonwealth,
724 S.E.2d 232 (Va. Ct. App. 2012); see also United States v. Groves, 559 F.3d 637 (7th
Cir. 2009) (officer is told by dispatcher there is a warrant for the defendant, but it's just a
"watch out" bulletin, which provides at most reasonable suspicion, not probable cause to
arrest; court finds good faith).
98 Echevarria-Rios, 746 F.3d at 41; Smith, 354 F. App'x at 102; Altman, 2009 WL
4065047, at *4; Brock, 91 So. 3d at 1006-07; Domino, 65 So. 3d at 292-93.
99 24 S.E.2d at 233.
100 Id.
1o Id. at 234.
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reckless disregard of constitutional requirements."' 02 Hence, the court
concluded, "application of the exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct
[in this case] 'does not pay its way."'1
0 3
Courts have also refused to suppress where officers relied on
erroneous stolen vehicle reports' or erroneous car registration
information' 05 acquired from their department (or more general law
enforcement) databases. In these three cases, the courts declared-usually
in a cursory fashion-that officers are entitled to trust these resources in the
absence of known recurring error. For example, in State v. Geiter, the Ohio
Appellate Court asserted, without documenting any facts about system
reliability, that the arresting officer "had no reason to question the
reliability of the local system's information."' 0 6 Even when the facts should
lead a reasonable person to question reliability, courts seem reluctant.
Consider McCain v. State, where the arresting officer testified that he had
encountered inaccurate information in the database "once out of the month,
maybe." 07 The Maryland Court of Appeals, failing to even consider
whether other officers in the department had similar experiences with the
database, concluded that problems were not sufficiently frequent to make
the database unreliable.ios
Courts have conducted a more searching inquiry into the source of the
error in cases that involve the past illegal procurement of a blood or DNA
sample, which was then used by a different officer to match the defendant
102 Id. at 236 (internal citation omitted).
103 Id. (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147-48 (2009)).
See, e.g., State v. Geiter, 942 N.E.2d 1161 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010).
1os See, e.g., United States v. Esquivel-Rios, 39 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1183 (D. Kan. 2014);
McCain v. State, 4 A.3d 53, 56 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010).
106 Geiter, 942 N.E.2d at 1167.
107 4 A.3d at 65.
1os Id. at 64-65. The court said this was "an occasional discrepancy" and agreed with the
trial court that "[t]here's nothing in [the] record that indicates that these officers knew that
there were frequent occurrences of MVA mistakes." Id. at 65 (emphasis added). Having
defined "systemic" error as requiring "frequent" error, the court concluded that even
monthly errors were not enough to impose exclusion. See id.
The courts' tolerance for error and ambiguity in this context mirrors its emphasis on
reasonableness rather than accuracy in the Fourth Amendment violation context: officers
don't need to be factually correct, just reasonable, in their assessment of the facts suggesting
authority to consent to search, for example. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 184-86
(1990). Likewise, probable cause does not require factual correctness to justify the police
intrusion that follows; reasonableness suffices. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232
(1983) and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
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to another crime.1 09 In the three cases that involved this scenario, courts
looked to the cause of the original error, asking if there was deliberate,
reckless, or grossly negligent error in taking the sample or in entering the
information in the law enforcement database." 0 They also watched for any
signs that the second officer was deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent in
relying on the sample or the database report in the new investigation of the
defendant.'' These discussions about database and user reliability were far
more extensive than the cursory reviews of the warrant and auto databases,
often containing pages of detail.1 2 Yet despite the serious attention that
courts directed to the systematic nature of the original error in the DNA
database cases, they still invoked the good faith exception; all three were
wins for the government. 11 3 To be fair, the crimes solved by the second
officers using DNA were serious,'1 4 which likely factored into the courts'
calculus." 5 Additionally, given the fairly new deployment of rules
governing the taking and maintenance of DNA samples," 6 the courts may
have felt constrained to conclude that the errors amounted to
understandable mistakes. In sum, in the DNA database context, while
courts appear to conduct a more probing analysis than they offer in the
warrant or auto database context, they still hold that these systems are
reasonably sufficient.
Moving beyond our assessment of the types of cases we found, we
have a few observations about the analytical theme of attenuation that
emerges in these cases. As one might predict, the degree of attenuation
increases when we add the spatial dimension to the personal, triggering an
inquiry that involves actors from multiple jurisdictions or agencies. There
109
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 239 n.21 (4th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Humbert, 336 F. App'x 132, 135-37 (3d Cir. 2009); People v. Robinson, 224 P.3d
55, 60-61 (Cal. 2010); see supra Table 1.
"1 See Davis, 690 F.3d at 239 n.21; Humbert, 336 F. App'x at 136; Robinson, 224 P.3d
at 69, 71.
See, e.g., Robinson, 224 P.3d at 69.
112 See, e.g., id. at 69-71.
"1 Davis, 690 F.3d at 239 n.21, 253; Humbert, 336 F. App'x at 136; Robinson, 224 P.3d
at 60-61.
114 Humbert, 336 F. App'x at 133 (armed bank robbery and carjacking); Robinson, 224
P.3d at 61 (rape).
"1 See, e.g., Davis, 690 F.3d at 256 ("The price to society of application of the
exclusionary rule here, especially since the DNA evidence against Davis was compelling,
would be to allow a person convicted of a deliberate murder to go free.").
116 See, e.g., Robinson, 224 P.3d at 63-64, 68-70.
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were nine such cases in our dataset, 117 and all nine resulted in findings of
good faith. The attenuation claim was particularly strong where the
behavior crossed state lines. Consider the Indiana Supreme Court's opinion
in Shotts v. State.'18 Indiana officers arrested David Shotts based on an
arrest warrant from Alabama, eventually leading to a criminal prosecution
in Indiana."1 9 When the warrant's status under Alabama law was called into
question, Shotts filed a motion to suppress the evidence acquired by the
Indiana police.1 20 The Indiana Supreme Court found that the officers did all
they could to verify the warrant and could not have known of the Alabama
state law problem.121 Moreover, the court doubted that exclusion would
hold its typical deterrent power when two jurisdictions are involved:
"[e]xclusion by an Indiana court in a proceeding under Indiana law would
not deter the Alabama officer who applied for the [defective] Alabama
warrant." 22 Shotts (and the other eight opinions) thus suggest that exclusion
is particularly inappropriate when multiple officers from multiple
jurisdictions are involved in the defendant's case.
The most egregious case of evidence laundering we found, United
States v. Woerner, involved cross-jurisdictional conduct between state and
federal agents in Texas.1 23 Mark Woerner was subject to "investigations
that were parallel[]" by state and federal authorities for possession of child
pornography. 12 4 The state officers executed what they knew was a stale
search warrant at Woerner's home; based on what they found, they arrested
Woemer. 125 While the defendant was in state custody following this arrest,
117 This total includes arrest warrant database cases, auto database cases, DNA database
cases, and individual officer conduct cases.
"1s See 925 N.E.2d 719 (Ind. 2010). The crossing of jurisdictional lines also arose in
State v. Brock, where the warrant was issued in Shreveport, Louisiana, but executed by
officers in Caddo Parish, Louisiana. 91 So. 3d 1003, 1004 (La. Ct. App. 2012). The differing
jurisdiction did not seem to factor explicitly into the court's analysis of good faith, though,
as the court simply declared that the Caddo Parish officers were not acting with reckless
disregard for constitutional requirements or with gross negligence by relying on the warrant.
Id. at 1007.
"1 Shotts, 925 N.E.2d at 721.
120 Id. at 722.
121 Id. at 726.
122 Id.
123 709 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 2013).
124 Id. at 535.
125 Id. at 531 ("[The Officer,] believing the warrant to be expired,... executed the
expired search warrant and seized computers, cameras, VHS tapes, photographs, and
electronic storage media.").
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federal agents came to the police station to talk to him.1 26 What they learned
from that interview they used to get a new search warrant for Woerner's
computer, and the evidence seized from the computer search provided the
basis of the federal prosecution of Woerner.1 2 7 Although there was some
evidence in the record that the federal agents were aware of the state
officers' misconduct at the time of the interview,1 2 8 the Fifth Circuit held
that the federal agents were "at most" negligent in interrogating Woerner
while he was in state custody and in using those statements in its warrant
application; therefore, suppression was not warranted.1 29 Notably, the court
did not evaluate the flagrancy of the state officers' misconduct.
One might be tempted to view Woerner as just an anomaly, a Fifth
Circuit mistake that will likely be confined to its unusual facts. But that
would be an unwise assumption. Just one year after the Woerner opinion
was issued the Fifth Circuit decided United States v. Massi, in which it
allowed an officer to launder his own evidence.' 30 In Massi, one officer
performed all of the relevant actions: illegally arresting the defendant,
seeking a search warrant based on observations made during that illegal
arrest, and executing the search warrant to obtain tangible evidence.' 3 ' The
Fifth Circuit opined that good faith does not require there to be a distinction
between the officers who commit the error and the officers who ultimately
obtain the challenged evidence, thus overlooking the personal attenuation
framework that seemed important to the Supreme Court in Herring.'32
Rather than citing and discussing Herring, the Fifth Circuit explained
that its conclusion flowed from Woerner's holding.' 33 The court said
"Woerner signals an openness to applying the good faith exception where
an earlier-in-time constitutional violation exists alongside a search warrant
126 Id. at 531-32.
127 Id. at 532-33.
128 The federal agent asked the state agent how long Woerner could be held before he
had to be let go. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 20, United States v. Woemer, 709 F.3d 527
(5th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-41380), 2012 WL 7993302. Such a question signals that the federal
agent was aware of potential problems with the arrest; his interrogation thus amounted to
exploitation of the illegality.
129 Woerner, 709 F.3d at 535. The appellate court cited the conclusion of the district
court with approval here: "the police misconduct leading to the inclusion of Woerner's
statements ... [in the] warrant application was at most the result of negligence of one or
more law enforcement officers." Id.
130 761 F.3d 512, 528 (5th Cir. 2014).
131 Id. at 517-19.
132 Id. at 528.
133 Id. at 525-26.
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that was sought and executed in good faith." 34 The court cited cases from
the Sixth, Second, and Eighth Circuits in support of its assertion that the
good faith exception can sometimes "overcome a taint from prior
unconstitutional conduct,"135 even when the same officer is involved from
start to finish. In that circumstance, the invocation of the good faith
exception should depend on that officer's "awareness . . . that [his] conduct
violated constitutional rights."l 3 6 By casting the officer's awareness of his
own errors as the trigger for exclusion, the Massi court elevated the officer
culpability standard set forth in Herring and abandoned the possibility pf
exclusion based on even gross or systemic negligence.1 37 In light of the
Fifth Circuit's sweeping decisions in Woerner and Massi, we have little
reason to be optimistic about future courts' willingness to reject or
constrain evidence laundering.
In contrast to the cases that validated the handoff procedure-often
based on a superficial assessment of the conduct at issue-courts that have
chosen suppression as the appropriate remedy have articulated a more
robust understanding of the problematic behavior; they have emphasized
the need for deterrence of misconduct wherever it occurs in the law
enforcement team. For example, in People v. Morgan,'38 the Illinois Court
of Appeals found that an officer who relied on a three-day-old warrant list
without attempting to verify the defendant's status was "willfully blind to
the facts" and thus reckless, rather than simply negligent.'3 9 In State v.
134 Id. at 526.
135 Id. at 527 (citing United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 564-66 (6th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Fletcher, 91 F.3d 48, 51-52 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Thomas, 757
F.2d 1359, 1368 (2d Cir. 1985)). It did note that the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits refuse to
apply the good faith exception to instances where a search warrant is issued on the basis of
unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Massi, 761 F.3d at 527 (citing United States v.
McGough, 412 F3d 1232, 1239-40 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782,
789-90 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Id. at 528. The court found the officer in question had reason to believe his behavior
was constitutionally acceptable and concluded that exclusion "would not serve the interest of
deterring future constitutional violations." Id. at 532.
137 Notably, the Massi opinion does not cite to Herring at all; Woerner is its main
precedent. Massi, 761 F.3d at 525-37 (citing United States v. Woemer, 709 F.3d 527 (5th
Cir. 2013) 30 times throughout the opinion).
901 N.E.2d 1049, 1061 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (noting the correct warrant list would
have not included the defendant's name and the case was not really about attenuation; it was
simple error by the arresting officer); accord People v. Arnold, 914 N.E.2d 1143, 1155 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2009) (an officer's failure to confirm the warrant status before handcuffing the
defendant was called "reckless disregard" by the court).
139 Id. at 1062.
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Handy, the New Jersey Supreme Court scolded a dispatcher who failed to
alert a police officer to discrepancies between the defendant's name and
birthdate and the information she was reporting from the warrant
database. 140 Calling the dispatcher a "co-operative" in the defendant's
arrest, the court declared that exclusion was necessary to deter such
"slipshod" behavior by law enforcement. 14 1 Any other result, the court said,
would mean that "police operatives . .. are free to act heedlessly and
unreasonably, so long as the last man in the chain does not do so.",142
Similarly, one federal trial court explicitly refused to allow evidence
laundering through the acquisition of a new warrant or interrogation that
was causally linked to unconstitutional behavior by other officers, even in
the absence of evidence that the second officers acted unreasonably. 143 In
United States v. Martinez, the court denied the use of the good faith
exception where "officers learn information during an unconstitutional
search and give that information to another officer for incorporation into the
warrant affidavit."'" The court further held that "[the good faith exception]
should not apply where an officer uses illegally obtained information during
questioning of the defendant to obtain a confession and then includes that
confession in the warrant affidavit."1 45
To sum up: overall, the government's chances of winning a handoff
case seem especially strong in the database context. When the original error
involves the faulty assembly or maintenance of an arrest warrant database,
DNA database, vehicle registration database, or some comparable
collection of information for law enforcement purposes, the good faith
exception almost always carries the day; fifteen of the seventeen database
error cases we examined resulted in a government win. This trend is
perhaps not surprising, given the often anonymous nature of database
inputs. It is hard to identify who is responsible for entry of (or failure to
remove) erroneous information, let alone that person's motives. The timing
140 18 A.3d 179, 184 (N.J. 2011).
141 Id. at 187. For this reason, the Handy court said its facts did not fall within the
"niche" carved out by Herring, which addressed only clerical and database errors. Id. at 187.
142 Id. at 188.
143 United States v. Martinez, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D.N.M. 2010).
144 Id. at 1262. This position is consistent with pre-Herring jurisprudence in the Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits, where a search warrant issued on the basis of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence cannot be saved by good faith. See, e.g., United States v. McGough, 412
F.3d 1232, 1239-40 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir.
1987) ("[W]e conclude that the magistrate's consideration of the evidence does not sanitize
the taint of the illegal warrantless search." (emphasis added)).
145 Martinez, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 1262-63.
656 [Vol. 106
EVIDENCE LAUNDERING
of the error also helps the government: the commission of the error might
be months or years removed from its effect in the defendant's case.
Generally speaking, when the nameless, faceless source of the error cannot
be interrogated, it is the defendant who loses. Anonymity dilutes the burden
of proof the prosecution is supposed to bear in the suppression hearing to
justify why illegally obtained evidence should be admitted despite the
constitutional error. 14 6
Identity issues aside, these opinions display an extraordinary
confidence in the reliability of databases generally, a confidence that does
not seem to be warranted. The Electronic Privacy Information Center wrote
in its amicus brief that accompanied Herring's certiorari petition that
"government and commercial databases are filled with errors, according to
the federal government's own reports."1 4 7 Moreover, because these database
systems are exempt from "important privacy and accuracy requirements"
contained in federal laws,1 4 8 the true scope of the error rate may be difficult
to calculate. For example, despite known problems in the National Crime
Information Center database, which receives information from state
criminal history repositories as well as from federal authorities, audits at the
federal and local level are "infrequent," often occurring less than once
every five years.1 4 9 For this reason, the Bureau of Justice Statistics has
lamented that "inadequacies in the accuracy and completeness of criminal
history records [are] the single most serious deficiency affecting the
Nation's criminal history record information systems.",150 Given the
146 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440-46 (1984) (insisting, in the context of the
inevitable discovery exception, that the government must establish by preponderance of the
evidence that an exclusionary rule exception applies). This burden is particularly important
when the defendant's access to technology or information is less than the government's
access to this data, as Justice Brennan explained in his dissent in Florida v. Riley. 488 U.S.
445, 465 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that where the "State has greater access to
information concerning" a technology or practice at issue, it ought to bear the burden of
proof in a suppression hearing about whether use of that technology or practice violates the
Constitution).
147 Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 6, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (No. 07-513), 2008 WL
2095709. According to its amicus brief, "the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
is a public interest research center in Washington, D.C., which was established in 1994 to
focus public attention on emerging civil liberties issues and to protect privacy, the First
Amendment, and other constitutional values." Id. at 1.
148 Id. at 6.
149 Id. at 14-15 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, IMPROVING ACCESS TO AND
INTEGRITY OF CRItMNAL HISTORY RECORDS, NCJ 200581 (2005)).
150 Id. at 14 (internal citation omitted).
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publicly available nature of these reports, courts that reflexively call
databases reliable seem to be shirking their responsibilities to dig deeper
when faced with a prosecution claim of good faith.
In contrast to their handling of errors that arise in the detached,
bureaucratized database context, courts treat errors that arise in direct
communication settings more cautiously. That is, when both the original
error and the later uses of the evidence are the work of field agents who are
in contact with each other, making customized decisions about warrants and
probable cause in a single case, the government's win rate is considerably
lower; only two out of four personal contact cases we analyzed resulted in
government wins. Where an individual officer makes an error with regard
to a suspect and another officer relies on that error in a case involving the
same suspect, it is easier for the court to follow the trail of decision-making
or neglect and to place blame at the foot of the wrongdoer. While the error-
producing officer, once identified, is not always labeled grossly negligent,
reckless, or deliberate in his misconduct, at least some courts have
expressed willingness to reach that conclusion when the errors committed
are obvious constitutional violations.
This pattern of twenty-one case outcomes we found indicates that,
despite the Supreme Court's acknowledgement of systemic negligence as an
exception to good faith, the good faith doctrine under Herring is designed
to be applied in an atomistic fashion. It seems limited to identifying and
deterring individual officer misconduct and incapable of detecting or
deterring fundamentally flawed information systems or interactions among
law enforcement agencies.
IV. EVALUATING EVIDENCE LAUNDERING
What do the opinions applying the good faith exception in handoff
situations suggest about the trajectory of the exclusionary rule after
Herring? In this Part, we consider the domestic implications of these
decisions in an era of fragmented law enforcement authority. In the Part
that follows, we examine the Herring line of cases from a comparative
perspective.
A. POST-HERRING CASE LAW AND THE REALITIES OF MODERN
POLICING
The first key takeaway from our review of Herring and of the
decisions that followed is the importance of evaluating law enforcement
conduct from an organizational perspective. Herring may make sense if we
focus on the individual officer who reasonably relied on the actions or
representations of a fellow officer. But in an environment where police
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action is increasingly the product of coordination among multiple officers
and agencies, the case has some troubling effects. By permitting the
laundering of tainted evidence through the handoff technique we described
earlier, the doctrine encourages a lack of communication and a culture of
ignorance among officers about the evidence collection practices of their
colleagues.151 This not only undermines the efficacy of exclusion, but also
impairs valuable law enforcement efforts.1 5 2
Multi-jurisdictional cases pose a particularly significant risk of
evidence laundering. Lines of communication between authorities from
different jurisdictions are typically less developed, and ignorance about the
evidence-gathering practices of colleagues in other departments is more
common. 15 3 Courts are also more apt to tolerate evidence laundering in such
cases, under the reasoning that officers from foreign jurisdictions would not
be deterred from exclusion in the forum court. 154 This reasoning pre-dates
Herring in some state court decisions, but Herring's broader view of
attenuation strengthened this view.155 Herring effectively breathed new life
into the silver platter doctrine that the Supreme Court rejected years ago.
Officers in one jurisdiction now have an incentive to pass along tainted
evidence to officers in another jurisdiction, without revealing problems in
the evidence collection process, because the good faith doctrine will
insulate their handoff.157 State and federal law enforcement often interact
151 While Herring permits exclusion in cases where courts find "systemic negligence,"
such claims would be very difficult to document and prove, for reasons mentioned in notes
15-16 and accompanying text.
152 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 956-57 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(observing that "[i]nevitably, the care and attention devoted" to communication will
"dwindle" if the courts fail to regard communication as important, and police officers will
provide each other "only the bare minimum of information" in order to retain the cloak of
deniability).
153 See, e.g., GERARD R. MURPHY & CHUCK WEXLER, POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM,
MANAGING A MULTIJURISDICTIONAL CASE: IDENTIFYING THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE
SNIPER INVESTIGATION 35-36 (2004); Aviram et al., supra note 14, at 717-18.
154 United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212, 1218 (11th Cir. 2007); Shotts v. State, 925
N.E.2d 719, 724 (Ind. 2010).
155 Cf Jenia I. Turner, Interstate Conflict and Cooperation in Criminal Cases: An
American Perspective, 4 EUR. CRIM. L. REv. 114, 130-35 (2014) (providing an overview of
different approaches to the admissibility of evidence in multi-jurisdictional cases).
156 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208-09 (1960). As early as the 1920s, the
Supreme Court began scrutinizing cooperation between federal and state authorities in
gathering evidence and excluded evidence where an unlawful search or seizure was the
product of joint action between the two. Logan, supra note 19, at 295-96.
157 As discussed earlier, Herring encourages courts to conduct little to no review of the
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with each other in joint task forces,s8 and interstate cooperation in the
gathering of evidence is on the rise.1 59 Courts' toleration of "dirty silver
platters" therefore has a much greater practical significance today than it
did in the 1940s, when the Supreme Court initially accepted the doctrine.160
The effects of Herring extend beyond reviving the silver platter
doctrine, however. Courts have also permitted evidence laundering when it
concerns different officers within the same jurisdiction and, indeed, even
within the same department. A number of two-step handoff decisions focus
exclusively on the effect that exclusion would have on the second officer,
who may have acted reasonably in gathering evidence he did not know was
tainted by earlier misconduct.'6 ' In focusing their attention so narrowly,
courts overlook the culpability of the first officer. Judges appear to be
assuming that, when it comes to the first officer, the broader educational
effect of exclusion is too attenuated to be worth the costs of losing
probative evidence and weakening the enforcement of criminal law.1 62
This cost-benefit analysis, focusing on the deterrence of individual
officers, runs contrary to a long-established line of cases, including Leon
itself, that insist the deterrence conversation is supposed to be about law
enforcement as a whole-not the particular officer who made the arrest.1 63
actions of the first officer. See supra notes 97-108, 123-137 and accompanying text. So
even when the first officer intentionally hides her misconduct, this behavior is likely to
escape scrutiny. This is especially true for cases occurring in two separate jurisdictions. See
supra notes 117-137 and accompanying text.
158
Logan, supra note 19, at 321-22; Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty:
Multifurisdictional Drug Law Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1159,
1201-08 (1995); Ronald F. Wright, Federal or State? Sorting as a Sentencing Choice, 21
CRIM. JUST. 16, 17-21 (2006).
159 See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: COMPACTS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENTS 169-70 (2002) (discussing "sharing system[s]" between
regional and federal programs); Logan, supra note 19, at 297, 321-22.
16 See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949); Logan, supra note 19, at
295-96. On the meaning of the silver platter doctrine, see supra note 18.
E.g., United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512, 525 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Echevarria-Rios, 746 F.3d 39, 41 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Altman, No. 09-CR-
20010, 2009 WL 4065047 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2009); Bellamy v. Commonwealth, 724 S.E.2d
232, 235 (Va. Ct. App. 2012); Domino v. Crowley City Police Dep't, 65 So. 3d 289, 292-93
(La. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Johnson, 6 So. 3d 195, 196 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
162 See, e.g., Bellamy, 724 S.E.2d at 235; McCain v. State, 4 A.3d 53, 60-61 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2010). As discussed earlier, in notes 109-116 and accompanying text, courts
have scrutinized the initial source of the error more closely in cases involving DNA
databases. Yet even in those cases, the courts ultimately applied the good faith exception and
declined to exclude the evidence.
163 It also runs counter to collective responsibility doctrines that govern policing in other
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It also ignores the realities of modem policing, in which responsibility for
law enforcement within the same jurisdiction is frequently dispersed
through several agencies.164 In this environment, a focus on attenuation and
individual culpability fails-systemically and predictably-to ensure proper
accountability for law enforcement actions. More broadly, it discourages
police agencies from coordinating efforts and sharing information more
effectively. 165
B. WEAKER REMEDY, STRONGER RIGHTS?
Could there be a silver lining to this paring down of the exclusionary
rule after Herring? One might argue that the tighter restrictions on the
exclusionary rule could help ensure the rule's future survival. The rule
remains highly controversial and calls for its abolition persist.
166 If Courts
restrict the use of exclusion to cases of egregious police misconduct, this
may make the exclusionary rule more palatable.
At the same time, even as the U.S. Supreme Court has reined in the
exclusionary rule, it has sharpened its rhetorical assault on the rule over the
last decade. 167 One could argue that each new cutback has made the rule's
future seem more precarious and its elimination more likely. Despite Justice
contexts, such as the inability of any police officer to interrogate a suspect who has invoked
his right to counsel. Under the Edwards line of cases, all officers-not just those who are
aware of the invocation-are prohibited from contacting the custodial suspect following a
right to counsel invocation, unless the suspect reinitiates contact himself. See Arizona v.
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1988); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-87 (1981).
Indeed, in Roberson, Justice Stevens asserted that no significance could be attached to the
fact that different officers were involved at different stages. 486 U.S. at 685.
164 Aviram et al., supra note 14, at 722 (discussing the statistics on cooperation among
agencies).
165 Id. at 730.
166 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 799-800 (1994); H. Mitchell Caldwell, Fixing the Constable's Blunder: Can One Trial
Judge in One County in One State Nudge a Nation Beyond the Exclusionary Rule?, 2006
BYU L. REV. 1, 30-69; Daniel E. Lungren, Victims and the Exclusionary Rule, 19 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 695, 697-701 (1996); Eugene Milhizer, The Exclusionary Rule Lottery,
39 U. TOL. L. REV. 755 (2008); Todd E. Pettys, Instrumentalizing Jurors: An Argument
Against the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 837, 837-38
(2010); Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U.
ILL. L. REV. 363, 364-66.
167 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427-28 (2011); Herring v. United States,
555 U.S. 135, 140-47 (2009); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590-99 (2006); James J.
Tomkovicz, Davis v. United States: The Exclusion Revolution Continues, 9 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 381, 382 (2011); see also TRACEY MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT'S EXCLUSIONARY RULE 302-47 (2012).
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Kennedy's assurance that these cutbacks are merely refinements and the
exclusionary rule is here to stay,168 there is reason to doubt its staying
power. 169
If the exclusionary rule does remain, albeit in a feeble version of its
original form, one positive effect of a more limited remedy. might be that
we see better search and seizure jurisprudence. If courts are not so
concerned that finding a violation will lead to exclusion and, in most cases,
a dismissal of the case, they may expand the interpretation of the
underlying Fourth Amendment rights. 170 Scholars have argued that the
bluntness of the exclusionary rule has caused courts to restrict constitutional
rights.'7 1 While this may be the case, it is not clear that the converse is also
true-that contracting the exclusionary remedy would lead courts to
interpret rights more generously.1 72 Limitations on the exclusionary rule
seem to be happening at the same time as jurisprudence cutting back on the
scope of the rights themselves, with a few recent exceptions. 173 This
suggests that a decades-long habit of interpreting Fourth Amendment rights
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 603 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he continued operation of the
exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, is not in doubt.").
169 See, e.g., MACLIN, supra note 167, at 346-47.
170 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J.
87, 89-91 (1999); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REv. 857, 858 (1999).
171
See, e.g., Amar, supra note 166, at 799; Calabresi, supra note 20, at 112-13;
Slobogin, supra note 166, at 401-03; see also Stuntz, supra note 20, at 793 ("The
government pays for criminal procedure rules in the coin of forgone arrests and
convictions.").
172 One Canadian scholar has suggested that the Canadian Supreme Court's broader
interpretation of privacy in search and seizure cases is the result at least in part of the more
flexible Canadian exclusionary rule. James Stribopoulos, Lessons from the Pupil: A
Canadian Solution to the American Exclusionary Rule Debate, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 77, 81-84 (1999). While this is a plausible interpretation, it is also possible that
differences in the texts of the Canadian Charter and of the U.S. Constitution, the interpretive
methods of the two Supreme Courts, and the ideology of the Justices have played a role.
For recent cases that have contracted Fourth Amendment rights, see, e.g., Maryland
v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013); Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856-64 (2011);
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381-86 (2007); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403-07(2006); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-10 (2005); United States v. Drayton, 536
U.S. 194, 207-08 (2002); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 327-55 (2001).
Contra Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494-95 (2014); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct.
1409, 1417-18 (2013); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951-54 (2012); Arizona v.
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009). The effects of these exceptions will be limited in the near
future, however, since police officers who relied on circuit precedent that was binding before
these exceptions came into being will also be protected by good faith. See Davis v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (2011).
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narrowly may be too ingrained and difficult to reverse, even if the remedy
becomes more flexible.
Compounding this problem, defendants may be discouraged from
bringing complaints as the odds of exclusion decline. As the petitioner in
Davis v. United States argued, criminal defendants have no incentive to
litigate the scope of constitutional rights if they are not likely to obtain
some personal benefit from the litigation. 17 4 If defendants increasingly
forgo challenging police misconduct, this would not only hinder the
development of Fourth Amendment law, but also deprive the public of the
educational and expressive benefits of suppression hearings. These benefits
include teaching police officers about rules on search and seizure and
expressing society's strong commitment to enforcing those rules.175
A softer, less predictable exclusionary rule may stunt the development
of Fourth Amendment doctrine in another way as well. When the decision
on exclusion is dispositive, courts may decide the remedial question first
and fail to properly analyze the legality of the underlying conduct. 176 The
174 Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-7, Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011)
(No. 09-11328), 2011 WL 972573; Alschuler, supra note 2, at 464-65, 495-99. But cf
Harry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: Heeding Justice
Blacknun's Call to Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial Understanding About Its
Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 45, 50 (1994) (citing to 1971 GAO study,
which found that 80-90% of suppression motions were unsuccessful, suggesting that a
number of defendants were willing to file unmeritorious motions given the low costs of
doing so compared to the great benefit if exclusion is granted); Stephen G. Valdes,
Frequency and Success: An Empirical Study of Criminal Law Defenses, Federal
Constitutional Evidentiary Claims, and Plea Negotiations, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1709, 1728,
App. B at 1743-45 (2005) (reporting results of 2005 survey showing that suppression
motions had an 11.6% success rate).
175 See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, Mapp v. Ohio's Unsung Hero: The Suppression Hearing
as Morality Play, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 255 (2010).
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-25 (1984) (suggesting that "courts could
reject suppression motions . . . by turning immediately to a consideration of the officers'
good faith"). Some courts are already doing that. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 354 F.
App'x 99, 102 (5th Cir. 2009) (deciding only the good faith question and not determining
whether the warrant was valid); United States v. Alabi, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1295-96
(D.N.M. 2013) (finding good faith where officers obtained credit card information without a
warrant, without deciding whether warrant was necessary). Courts have long been allowed to
do this in the qualified immunity context when section 1983 actions are filed. See Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32, 236 (2009). This has caused some commentators to assert
that the development of the doctrine on constitutional violations has suffered. E.g., Jack M.
Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009 SUP. CT. REv. 139, 149-
50 (2009); Paul W. Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier Sequencing and the
Articulation of Constitutional Rights, 80 U. COLO. L. REv. 401, 401, 409-11 (2009); cf
Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP.
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more frequently this happens, the less we are likely to see development in
Fourth Amendment law. While it is possible that doctrine will still evolve
in the context of civil cases, it remains true that "most Fourth Amendment
law is made in criminal proceedings."l7 7 Given the marginal contribution of
civil actions to doctrinal growth, we believe the exclusionary rule remains
an important tool for regulating police conduct. 7 8
C. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF HERRING AND ITS PROGENY
The recent exclusionary rule trends are also significant from a
comparative perspective. Our Supreme Court has long defined American
criminal procedure in opposition to foreign systems, particularly
inquisitorial systems.17 9 To some degree, this resistance to foreign
approaches has been grounded in a belief that they are "worse at uncovering
the truth, worse at protecting individual rights, or worse at preventing
abuses of government authority."o Moreover, some justices have shown a
particular distaste for considering foreign or international law when
answering questions about American constitutional rules-not because
foreign laws are perceived as worse at protecting individual rights, but
rather because of a belief that our constitutional text is unique and should
not be guided by foreign legal values and authorities.'8 1 Yet with decisions
such as Herring,'82 the Supreme Court has brought our exclusionary rule
L. REv. 667, 670 (2009) (finding that deciding the merits first leads to the "articulation of
more constitutional law, but not the expansion of constitutional rights").
177 Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REv. 405, 428 (2012).
David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
567, 578-80 (2008). For a proposal on how civil actions can be made more effective (e.g.,
by imposing individual liability for bad faith police conduct), see Slobogin, supra note 21, at
349.
179 David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARv. L. REv. 1634, 1639-41
(2009) (noting Court's distrust of inquisitorial or civil-law systems, but also the Court's
misunderstanding of key features of modern inquisitorial systems).
180 Id. at 1641.
181 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624-28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324-25 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). But see Lafler
v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing to the legality
principle in a number of European jurisdictions as an "admirable" limit on plea bargaining).
182 As discussed in the Introduction, Herring is one of several recent Supreme Court
cases that significantly cut back on the exclusionary rule. See also Davis v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 583 (2006). Hudson's claim that
"[s]uppression of evidence .. . has always been our last resort, not our first impulse," 547
U.S. at 591 (emphasis added), is historically inaccurate. Davies & Scanlon, supra note 2, at
1058-59. But if suppression is now our last resort, we are in line with the approach taken by
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much closer to its counterparts in foreign systems, both common-
law/adversarial and civil-law/inquisitorial.1 83 In the pages that follow, we
identify these areas of convergence and then discuss their implications.
D. INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE IN THE EXCLUSIONARY REMEDY
A broad range of common-law and civil-law jurisdictions today rely
on a balancing approach to determine whether to exclude unlawfully
obtained evidence. 18 They weigh the effect of factors such as the
seriousness of the misconduct, the gravity of the offense, and the
importance of the rights violated. American case law on the exclusionary
rule increasingly resembles these approaches in three important ways. First,
the cost-benefit analysis urged by cases such as Herring is similar in its
broad outline to the totality-of-circumstances approach used by other
systems. Second, here and abroad, exclusion is increasingly reserved for
reckless, intentional, or systematic breaches of the law. Third, exclusion of
indirect evidence is disfavored more often in U.S. courts after Herring, just
as it is in many other common-law and civil-law systems.
other nations who embrace a sliding scale of remedies.
183 Cf Yue Ma, The American Exclusionary Rule: Is There a Lesson to Learn from
Others?, 22 INT'L CRIM. JUST. REv. 309, 321 (2012) (suggesting that the Court's decision to
"inquire into the degree of police culpability in each case and apply the exclusionary rule
only in cases where there is sufficient degree of police culpability . .. brings the American
exclusionary rule practice a step closer to the practice in England and Canada"); Stephen C.
Thaman, Balancing Truth Against Human Rights: A Theory of Modern Exclusionary Rules,
in EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW: 20 IUS GENTIUM 403, 430 (Stephen C.
Thaman ed., 2013) (arguing that the Supreme Court's recent emphasis on a balancing, cost-
benefit analysis to exclusion is "paving the way for a possible return to the old Common
Law presumption of admissibility of relevant evidence, or its inquisitorial counterpart which
prioritized truth over rights").
184 Sabine Gless, Germany: Balancing Truth Against Protected Constitutional Interests,
in EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 183, at 113, 119-20; Christopher
Slobogin, A Comparative Perspective on the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure
Cases, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 280 (Jacqueline E.
Ross & Stephen C. Thaman eds., 2016); Jenia lontcheva Turner, Limits on the Search for
Truth in Criminal Procedure: A Comparative View, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 35, supra. In countries that have recently emerged
from a totalitarian regime, however, legislators and courts are more likely to adopt strict,
categorical exclusionary rules as a symbol of a commitment to the rule of law. Jenia
Iontcheva Turner, The Exclusionary Rule as a Symbol of the Rule of Law, 67 SMU L. REV.
821, 825-26 (2014); cf Scott E. Sundby, Everyman's Exclusionary Rule: The Exclusionary
Rule and the Rule of Law (or Why Conservatives Should Embrace the Exclusionary Rule),
10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW 393, 399-401 (2013) (discussing the relationship between the
exclusionary rule and the rule of law).
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Modem exclusionary rules across a number of common-law and civil-
law jurisdictions are converging towards a balancing approach. Historically,
common-law courts ignored irregularities in the gathering of evidence, as
long as the evidence obtained was deemed reliable.18 1 Contemporary
common-law courts, such as those in Canada, England, and Australia, now
accept the exclusion remedy on a limited basis. These courts exclude
evidence when they conclude, upon examination of the totality of
circumstances, that an illegality in the evidence-gathering process would
undermine the integrity of the judicial system or the fairness of the
proceedings. 186
A number of continental European countries, including Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Germany, likewise rely on a case-by-case balancing
approach in deciding whether to exclude evidence obtained in violation of
rules pertaining to search or seizure.187 A similar exclusionary rule applies
185 JOHN D. JACKSON & SARAH J. SUMMERS, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE: BEYOND THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS 153 (2012).
186 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 35(5) (evidence obtained in violation of the Bill of Rights
"must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or
otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice"); Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitutional Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982,
c. 24 (U.K.); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 138(3) (Austl.); Police and Criminal Evidence Act
(PACE), 1984, c. 60, § 78, sch. 3 (Eng.); Evidence Act 2006, § 30(3) (N.Z.); R. v. Grant,[2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 (Can.); CrimA 5121/98 Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor 1
IsrSC 320, 421 [2006] (Isr.); H.M. Advocate v. Higgins, [2006] HCJ 5; (2006) S.C.C.R 305
(Scot.); Andrew L.-T. Choo, England and Wales: Fair Trial Analysis and the Presumed
Admissibility of Physical Evidence, in EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW, supra
note 183, at 331, 342-43, 352. Ireland applies a similar approach with respect to evidence
obtained in violation of ordinary law, but uses a stricter, more categorical approach when a
constitutional rule has been violated. DPP v. Kenny, [1990] 2 I.R. 110, 134 (Ir.).
187 See Marie-Aude Beernaert & Philip Traest, Belgium: From Categorical Nullities to a
Judicially Created Balancing Test, in EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW, supra
note 183, at 161, 165-66 (discussing Belgium); Matthias J. Borgers & Lonneke Stevens, The
Netherlands: Statutory Balancing and a Choice of Remedies, in EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 183, at 183, 204-06 (discussing the Netherlands); Gless,
supra note 184, at 113, 139 (discussing Germany); Marc Groenhuijsen, Illegally Obtained
Evidence: An Analysis of New Trends in the Criminal Justice System of the Netherlands, in
THE XIIITH WORLD CONGRESS OF PROCEDURAL LAW: THE BELGIAN AND DUTCH REPORTS
(2008) (discussing the Netherlands); Joachim Meese, The Use of Illegally Obtained
Evidence in Belgium: A 'Status Questionis,' 10 DIGITAL EVIDENCE & ELECTRONIC
SIGNATURE L. REV. 63, 64-65 (2013) (discussing Belgium); Thomas Weigend, Throw It All
Out? Judicial Discretion in Dealing with Procedural Faults, in DISCRETIONARY CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 185, 191-92 (Michele Caianiello & Jacqueline S.
Hodgson eds., 2015) (noting that German courts engage in an "open-ended weighing of the
interests involved"). Countries such as France and Italy, which at first glance appear to use a
more categorical nullities approach, nonetheless rarely exclude evidence obtained in
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in international criminal courts.' 88 Judges exclude evidence under this
approach to preserve the fairness of the proceedings, to promote systemic
integrity, or to protect individual rights. 18 9 Courts weigh these aims against
the competing public interests in uncovering the truth about the case and
enforcing the criminal law. Disciplining the police is not an important
consideration. 190
While the foreign courts we examine differ on the factors they view as
important in the balancing analysis, they consistently examine the gravity
of police misconduct in deciding whether to exclude evidence. Exclusion is
violation of search and seizure provisions because courts have developed broad exceptions
to nullities. In France, courts apply a nullity in only about 25% of cases where a nullity is
requested, largely because of a requirement that the nullity must have damaged the interests
of the party requesting it (i.e., the defendant). Jean Pradel, France: Procedural Nullities and
Exclusion, in EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 183, at 145, 149 &
n.20; see also Richard S. Frase, France, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY
201, 212-14 (Craig Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2008). In Italy, courts treat seizures separately from
searches, so violations occurring during a search are rarely found to taint the subsequent
seizure of the evidence. Italian courts thus regularly admit evidence obtained as a result of an
unlawful search. See, e.g., ANDREA RYAN, TOWARDS A SYSTEM OF EUROPEAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: THE PROBLEM OF ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 202-07 (2014).
188 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 69(7), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90; Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Admission of Material from the "Bar Table," 1 38 (June 24, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc702244.pdf; Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on the
Defence "Objection to Intercept Evidence," ¶ 63 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 3, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/031003.htm.
189 See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitutional Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 24 (U.K.) ("[T]he evidence shall be
excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in
the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute."); Police and
Criminal Evidence Act (PACE), 1984, c. 60, § 78(1), sch. 3 (Eng.) (adopting a fairness-
oriented approach); R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, paras 68-70 (Can.) (elaborating on the
judicial integrity rationale established by Section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter); DPP v.
Kenny, [1990] 2 I.R. 110, 134 (Ir.) (justifying exclusion with reference to the
"unambiguously expressed constitutional obligation 'as far as practicable to defend and
vindicate the personal rights of the citizen'); Weigend, supra note 187, at 192, 196 (noting
that German courts typically weigh the protection of individual rights against the search for
truth in deciding whether to exclude). See generally Slobogin, supra note 184.
190 R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, para. 70 (Can.) (noting that the Section 24(2) of the
Canadian Charter "is not aimed at punishing the police or providing compensation to the
accused"); R. v. Delaney, (1989) 88 Cr. App. R. 338 (Eng.); R. v. Mason, (1988) 1 W.L.R.
139, 144 (Eng.); Weigend, supra note 187, at 189 (noting that German courts and scholars
do not regard exclusion as a means of disciplining police); cf JONATHAN DOAK & CLAIRE
McGOURLAY, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE IN CONTEXT 291 (2d ed. 2009) (noting that English courts
continue to profess a reluctance to discipline police, though they do tend to exclude more
often in cases of bad faith acts by police).
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more likely where a violation is intentional, reckless, or part of a pattern.191
For less serious breaches, these courts may impose less drastic remedies,
such as declaratory relief or sentence discounts after conviction.192
For example, in England, bad faith on part of police officers may
convert a minor legal breach into a "'significant and substantial' breach of
the rules [that] weigh[s] heavily in favor of exclusion, but [does] not lead
automatically to exclusion."1 93 Conversely, good faith on the part of
officers will typically weigh in favor of admitting the evidence, though
certain violations may be so substantial that exclusion will follow even if
the police act in good faith. 19 4 In Australia, the Uniform Evidence Act calls
on courts to consider, among other factors, "the gravity of the impropriety
or contravention, and ... whether the impropriety or contravention was
deliberate or reckless ... ."195 This factor is also relevant under Australian
common law, which continues to govern in territories that have not yet
adopted the Uniform Act. 196 Canadian case law has likewise long
emphasized the relevance of the seriousness of the breach, including
whether the officers acted deliberately or recklessly, or conversely, in good
faith.197
191 See, e.g., Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 138(3) (Austl.); Evidence Act 2006, § 30(3)
(N.Z.); R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, paras 73-75 (Can.); R. v. Canale, (1990) 91 Cr.
App. R. 1 (Eng.); CrimA 5121/98 Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor, 1 IsrSC 320 421
[2006] (Isr.).
192 See, e.g., R. v. Nasogaluak (2007), 229 C.C.C. (3d) 52 (Alta. C.A.); Chraidi v.
Germany, 47 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2, ¶¶ 24-25 (2006); ANDREw BUTLER & PETRA BUTLER, THE
NEw ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT: A COMMENTARY 1037 § 29.6.5 (2005); Borgers &
Stevens, supra note 187, at 190.
193 Choo, supra note 186, at 342.
194 Id.
195 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 138(3) (Austl.).
196 Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54, 78-80 (Austl.) (holding that in deciding
whether to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence, judges should consider the nature of the
crime charged; whether the violation was deliberate, reckless, or accidental; whether the
violation affected the reliability of the obtained evidence; the ease with which the authorities
might have complied with the law in procuring the evidence in question; and the legislative
intention with respect to the law said to be violated); Kenneth J. Arenson, Rejection of the
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine in Australia: A Retreat from Progressivism, 13 U.
NOTRE DAME AUSTL. L. REv. 17, 20 (2011).
197 This factor has become even more prominent with the recent revision of the
exclusionary rule. See R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, paras 75, 214 (Can.); Don Stuart,
Welcome Flexibility and Better Criteria from the Supreme Court of Canada for Exclusion of
Evidence Obtained in Violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 16 Sw. J.
INT'L L. 313, 314, 318 (2010); see also David Porter & Brent Kettles, The Significance of
Police Misconduct in the Analysis of s. 8 Charter Breaches and the Exclusion of Evidence
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The focus on the flagrancy of the officer's misconduct is not limited to
Anglo-American nations; it can be found throughout Europe. For example,
one of the factors Belgian courts consider when balancing interests is
whether the authorities violated the law deliberately.198 German courts are
also more likely to exclude evidence where officers purposefully or
systematically violate the law. 199 A similar inquiry into the officer's
motivation and state of mind occurs in Denmark, the Netherlands, and (with
-200respect to indirect evidence) in Spain.
In addition to limiting exclusion mostly to cases where the police
deliberately violated the law, many foreign courts tend to admit evidence
that was an indirect product of an unlawful search or seizure (or in U.S.
parlance, "fruit of the poisonous tree").201 When confronting cases
involving evidence that is indirectly derived from an initial breach of the
law, English courts focus on the influence that the initial breach has on the
derivative evidence.202 But even if judges find a causal connection between
Under s. 24(2) in R. v. Grant, R. v. Harrison and R. v. Morelli, 58 CRIM. L.Q. 510 (2012).
198 Meese, supra note 187, at 64-65.
199 Weigend, supra note 187, at 194 (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of
Justice] Apr. 18, 2007, 51 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN STRAFSACHEN
285), 2007 (Ger.)) (upholding exclusion where the police "intentionally circumvented the
protective warrant requirement"); Weigend, supra note 187, at 194 (citing
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 9, 2011, NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2417, 2011 (Ger.)) (noting evidence would be
excluded "if there has been a grave, conscious, or arbitrary violation of procedural law
which infringed upon the protection of an individual's fundamental rights in a planned or
systematic fashion"). Thomas Weigend has noted a trend toward exclusion in recent German
decisions, "especially where important individual rights have been violated and the law
enforcement officer acted without good faith." Id. at 195.
200 E.U. NETWORK OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, OPINION ON THE
STATUS OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE IN CRIMNAL PROCEDURES IN THE MEMBER
STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 12-13 (2003) (discussing Denmark); AYA GRUBER ET AL.,
PRACTICAL GLOBAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: UNITED STATES, ARGENTINA, AND THE
NETHERLANDS 223 (2012) (citing the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 359a, §2); Ties
Prakken & Taru Spronken, The Investigative Stage of the Criminal Process in the
Netherlands, in SUSPECTS IN EUROPE 155, 174 (Ed Cape et al. eds., 2007); Lorena Bachmaier
Winter, Spain: The Constitutional Court's Move from Categorical Exclusion to Limited
Balancing, in EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 183, at 209, 216-17.
201 See Stephen C. Thaman, "Fruits of the Poisonous Tree" in Comparative Law, 16 Sw.
J. INT'L L 333, 353 (2010).
202 Choo, supra note 186, at 343 (noting that in deciding whether to exclude indirect
evidence, English courts consider whether the initial violation continued to exert a "malign
influence" on the indirect evidence obtained (quoting Y. v. DPP, [1991] Crim. LR 917)); see
also Borgers & Stevens, supra note 187, at 190 n.25 (noting that Dutch courts exclude
derivative evidence only when it is "exclusively" the result of the unlawful act and that "[i]t
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the initial breach and the derivative evidence, they may still decline to
exclude. To decide the exclusion question, English judges also consider
whether the initial breach is "flagrant or merely technical," 2 0 3 or in another
formulation, whether it is deliberate.204 Australian, German, and Israeli
courts entirely reject the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine,205 while
* * 206
other courts recognize it in a limited fashion.
In short, foreign courts tend to admit fruits of unlawfully obtained
evidence and evidence obtained in good faith by the police, just as our
courts increasingly do after Herring. And similar to the way in which U.S.
courts now weigh the costs and benefits of exclusion, so too, their foreign
counterparts resolve questions of exclusion after balancing competing aims
of the criminal justice system.
Given the combination of these factors, it is not surprising to find that
"good faith" mistakes by officers are frequently excused abroad, including
in cases of evidence laundering.20 7 Indeed, foreign courts sometimes admit
evidence even when the "good faith" mistake involves a single officer,
is not sufficient (any more) that the fruit of the poisonous tree is largely the result of those
actions"); Findlay Stark & Fiona Leverick, Scotland: A Plea for Consistency, in
EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 183, at 69, 88-89 (noting that
Scottish courts consider "whether the accused's right to a fair trial would be violated
by ... leading [derivative] evidence" (citation omitted)).
203 Choo, supra note 186, at 343 (citing R. v. Wood, [1994] Crim. LR 222).
204 Id. (citing Y. v. DPP, [1991] Crim. LR 917).
205 See, e.g., CrimA 5121/98 Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor, 1 IsrSC 320, 382
[2006] (Isr.); Arenson, supra note 196, at 18 (discussing how the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine had been "rejected altogether" in Australia); Gless, supra note 184, at 128
(Germany).
206 Runar Torgersen, Truth or Due Process? The Use of Illegally Gathered Evidence in
the Criminal Trial in Norway, FOLK.UIO.NO 11, http://folk.uio.no/giudittm/IACLTruth%
20or/o20due%20process.pdf. In Spain, courts use a balancing test to determine whether to
exclude evidence indirectly derived from a breach, and the officer's state of mind in
committing the breach is an important factor. Winter, supra note 200, at 232.
207 See, e.g., R. v. Wilson, [2003] CarswellOnt 9051 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL)
(admitting evidence in Herring-type scenario where database error led officer to make
wrongful arrest and search incident to arrest); R. v. White, [2006] O.N.C.J. 147 (Can. Ont.)
(noting that the burden of proof with respect to reliability of arrest warrant and criminal
record database is on the prosecution but, after balancing several factors, refusing to
suppress at least in part because officer's reliance on erroneous database was not flagrant);
R. v. Koziak, [2005] ABQB 278, paras 30-33, 58 (Alta. Q.B.) (admitting evidence where it
was uncovered as a result of one officer's reliance on another officer's misinterpretation of a
database result); cf NICK KASCHUK, 24(2): EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE UNDER THE CHARTER
82-88 (2014) (discussing Canadian cases in which evidence was admitted on the grounds
that it was obtained in "good faith" by police).
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similar to the scenario in Massi. 2 08 In some respects, foreign courts excuse a
broader range of "good faith" errors by police officers than U.S. courts
currently do (although Massi suggests that our exclusionary rule
jurisprudence may be moving in the same direction).
Yet the flexible balancing approach means that negligent mistakes will
sometimes lead to suppression in foreign courts. The Canadian Supreme
Court has explicitly stated that "ignorance of [constitutional] standards
must not be rewarded or encouraged and negligence or willful blindness
cannot be equated with good faith."209 While foreign courts do not always
take such a clear view on the distinction between negligence and good faith,
they do occasionally suppress evidence for negligent breaches.210
This points to an important remaining difference between the U.S. and
foreign approaches. Although U.S. courts increasingly weigh the costs and
benefits of exclusion, this balancing is typically translated into a categorical
approach subject to a host of exceptions (attenuation, standing, independent
source, inevitable discovery, and so on). Ours remains a somewhat more
rule-bound approach, even if the proliferation of factors for courts to
consider after Herring has made our rule more flexible and closer to the
balancing approach used in other countries. 211 As a result, our categorical
exceptions to the exclusionary rule at times sweep more broadly and result
in the admission of tainted evidence in cases where a fully discretionary
208 United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2014); see supra Part III. For examples
of foreign jurisdictions addressing this issue, see, e.g., R. v. Ramsammy, [2013] O.N.S.C.
7374 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (admitting evidence seized as a result of "good faith" mistake
by officer in reading the code from a breath screening device); R. v. Tiplady, (1995) 159 J.P.
548 (Eng.) (admitting evidence resulting from good faith mistake by officers about the
application of statute to them); Tobias Paul, Unselbstdndige Beweisverwertungsverbote in
der Rechtsprechung, 9 NSTZ 489, 491 (2013) (discussing case in which German court
admitted evidence obtained by an officer who mistakenly assumed that the person taking a
blood sample was a doctor (as required under the law) when in fact, the person was a
medical assistant unauthorized to draw a suspect's blood under the circumstances).
209 R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, para. 75 (Can.) (original in French).
210 See, e.g., R. v. Wilson, 2003 CarswellOnt 9051 (citing unnamed case in which trial
judge excluded evidence in Herring-type case); R. v. R. (J.F.R.), [1991] Y.J. No. 235 (Can.
Yukon Terr. Ct.) (excluding evidence); see also R. v. Veneroso, [2001] Crim. LR 306 (U.K.)
(excluding evidence even though police acted in "good faith" but misinterpreted the law); R
v. Goodwin [1993] NZLR 153 (CA) (noting that to excuse a violation of the Bill of Rights
on the grounds that it was done in good faith would encourage police ignorance of the law);
R v. Narayan [1992] 3 NZLR 145 (CA), 1992 NZLR LEXIS 646, at *15 (excluding
evidence despite good faith conduct by police); DPP v. Godwin [1991] R.T.R. 303, 308
(Q.B.) (Eng.) (upholding exclusion of evidence even though police had not acted in "bad
faith" in arresting defendant for refusing to submit to breath test).
211 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
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rule would lead to suppression. For example, under Herring, an illegal
search incident to arrest does not result in exclusion of evidence if the
search is based on "isolated [police] negligence attenuated from the
arrest." 2 12 By contrast, under a full-blown balancing approach, negligent
conduct may occasionally (albeit very rarely) trigger exclusion, even if
attenuation is also present.2 13
Even as the U.S. approach remains somewhat more categorical than
that of foreign courts, the common trend toward balancing and
consideration of officer culpability is notable. Our courts probably still
exclude evidence at greater rates than their foreign counterparts, but that
gap appears to be narrowing.
E. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE ON
REMEDIES
The converging trends in exclusionary rule doctrines around the world
might offer us valuable information as we speculate about the future of
criminal justice remedies in the United States. The balancing approach
applied by foreign jurisdictions has both advantages and disadvantages that
U.S. courts should consider as our approaches converge.
One of the chief weaknesses of the balancing approach is that its
flexibility carries the risk of inconsistent and unpredictable decisions. To
the extent it relies on a subjective evaluation of officers' state of mind, a
balancing approach also raises practical difficulties for defendants in
proving this element. And finally, because balancing expands in some
respects the range of cases in which unlawfully obtained evidence is
admitted, this likely reduces the disciplinary effect of exclusion.
Yet balancing also offers some potential advantages. In certain
circumstances, its openness allows judges to exclude evidence to ensure
systemic integrity where our deterrence-oriented approach would call for
admission. The flexibility of the balancing approach also permits courts to
consider alternative remedies, such as sentence reductions or jury cautions,
in some cases where our zero-sum approach would lead to admissibility
because of concerns about the costs of exclusion. While empirical evidence
212 Id. at 137.
213 In Canada, the jurisdiction that appears to have the strictest balancing test, evidence
in Herring-type cases is admitted in the overwhelming majority of cases. See supra note
207. For an example of a rare exception, see R. v. Wilson, 2003 CarswellOnt 9051 (citing
unnamed case in which trial judge excluded evidence in Herring-type case); R. v. R.
(J.F.R.), [1991] Y.J. No. 235 (Can. Yukon Terr. Ct.) (excluding evidence).
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on the practical effects of the balancing approach is very limited, existing
data suggest that it need not severely undermine the exclusionary rule.
The first observation about the convergence in international practices
under the exclusionary rule is that a balancing test might produce
inconsistent and seemingly arbitrary results. This has been a concern in a
number of systems, both civil-law and common-law.2 14 While some courts
have attempted to restrict the factors to be used in the balancing approach,
unpredictability remains.215 One area of exclusionary analysis in which a
number of foreign courts have struggled to apply a consistent approach
concerns officers' culpability. While courts tend to agree that bad faith (or
deliberate violations) should favor exclusion, they disagree on what
constitutes "good faith" and how a finding of "good faith" should affect the
exclusionary analysis.216
Because balancing remains more malleable, decisions may reflect the
proclivities of individual judges, rather than the law.217 A study of the
Israeli exclusionary rule, which found that about half of the decisions to
exclude evidence in the country could be traced to just two liberal judges,
suggests that this concern may be justified.2 18
Beyond unpredictability, another disadvantage of the balancing
approach is that it is likely to expand the range of cases in which tainted
evidence is admitted. As we noted earlier, foreign courts frequently admit
evidence derived from the "good faith" mistake of a single officer-
214 See Scott L. Optican & Peter J. Sankoff, The New Exclusionary Rule: A Preliminary
Assessment of R v Shaheed, 2003 N.Z. L. REv. 1, 23 (noting that the discretionary balancing
approach endorsed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal "is horribly uncertain and capable
of infinite manipulation and/or abuse"); Stark & Leverick, supra note 202, at 72.
215 See Optican & Sankoff, supra note 214, at 23; David Ormerod & Diane Birch, The
Evolution of the Discretionary Exclusion of Evidence, 2004 CRIM. L. REV. 767, 785-86;
Stark & Leverick, supra note 202, at 89; Weigend, supra note 187.
216 See, e.g., Steve Coughlan, Good Faith, Bad Faith and the GulfBetween: A Proposal
for Consistent Terminology, 15 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 197, 198 (2011); Jordan Hauschildt,
Blind Faith: The Supreme Court of Canada, s. 24(2) and the Presumption of Good Faith
Police Conduct, 56 CRIM. L. Q. 469 (2010); Optican & Sankoff, supra note 214, at 24-25
(discussing the ambiguity in New Zealand case law as to whether good faith weighs in favor
of admitting the evidence); Stuart, supra note 197, at 328 (noting that the terms good faith
and bad faith had "produced uncertainty and inconsistency").
217 See, e.g., Optican & Sankoff, supra note 214, at 23-24 (arguing that New Zealand's
open-ended balancing test is "a licence for personal judicial predilection to masquerade as
principle").
218 Binyamin Blum, "Exclude Evidence You Exclude Justice"? A Critical Evaluation of
Israel's Exclusionary Rule After Issacharov, 16 Sw. J. INT'L L. 385, 403-04 (2010).
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whether a mistake of fact219 or of law.220 Moreover, to the extent that
balancing courts use a subjective approach to analyze the officer's state of
mind, defendants have had difficulty proving that an officer has deliberately
violated the law.221 As a result, only egregious and obvious instances of bad
faith have tended to result in exclusion, while negligent and sloppy policing
has frequently remained unaddressed. 2 22 Balancing has also led foreign
courts generally to admit indirect fruits of an unlawful police search or
seizure.223 Finally, when the crime charged is very serious and the evidence
central to the case, foreign courts have sometimes admitted even evidence
derived from a significant and deliberate violation of the law.224 Under the
balancing approach, the public interest in resolving a serious crime on the
merits often outweighs the interests in disciplining the police and
safeguarding individual rights.
While on average, open-ended balancing likely leads to more frequent
admission of tainted evidence than even the weak post-Herring U.S.
exclusionary rule, there are some instances in which the balancing approach
will prove more protective of defendants' rights. On occasion, the
commitment to systemic integrity will lead to exclusion under a balancing
approach even when the nominally categorical, deterrence-oriented U.S.
approach would call for admission of the evidence. For example, even if
one officer relies in "good faith" on the actions of another officer who has
acted merely negligently, a court concerned with systemic integrity may
suppress evidence in order to discourage sloppy law enforcement,
especially if the crime charged is not serious. 225 By contrast, under an
219 See, e.g., Paul, supra note 208.
220 See, e.g., R. v. Tiplady, (1995) 159 J.P. 548 (Eng.).
221 See, e.g., Stephen G. Coughlan, Good Faith and Exclusion of Evidence Under the
Charter, 11 C.R. (4th) 304, 312 (1992); Hauschildt, supra note 216, at 471, 490, 502;
Ormerod & Birch, supra note 215, at 781.
222 Coughlan, supra note 221, at 312; Hauschildt, supra note 216, at 471, 490, 502;
Ormerod & Birch, supra note 215, at 781 (noting this toleration of sloppy policing and
arguing that the emphasis on bad faith in English case law "might even be to encourage the
police to be sloppy in their investigations since if an officer is unaware of the regulation he
cannot be said to have acted in bad faith").
223 See supra notes 201-206 and accompanying text.
224 See, e.g., R. v. White, [2006] O.N.C.J. 147 (Can. Ont.) (noting that the burden of
proof with respect to reliability of arrest warrant and criminal record database is on the
prosecution but, after balancing several factors, refusing to suppress at least in part because
officer's reliance on erroneous database was not flagrant); KASCHUK, supra note 207;
Gerson Triig & Jorg Habetha, Beweisverwertung trotz rechtswidriger Beweisgewinnung-
insbesondere mit Blick auf die "Liechtensteiner Steuerafdre," 9 NSTZ 481, 485-86 (2008).
225 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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approach that categorically declares good faith reliance does not justify the
cost of exclusion, considerations about the integrity of the justice system
would not be taken into account.
Perhaps the most interesting comparative question, however, is one we
know the least about: Does balancing increase or reduce the likelihood of
exclusion? There is no comparative empirical study that answers this
question. Nor is it clear that any study could provide an answer, since
judges' readiness to exclude evidence depends on much more than doctrine.
The severity of the crime, public attitudes towards the balance between
security and liberty, and legal tradition (including whether the exclusionary
rule is relatively recent) may all influence suppression decisions.226
It is nonetheless informative to review some of the data that do exist
on exclusion rates in different countries and to consider the correlation
between these rates and the approach to exclusion. Among the studies we
reviewed, the one that reported the lowest suppression rate was from Israel.
It found that the balancing test developed by the Israeli Supreme Court in
2006 has led to suppression of evidence in only 11% (14 of 126) of cases in
which the constitutional violation claim succeeded on the merits. 2 27
A 2001 study from Australia-where courts also use a balancing
approach to exclusion-found that trial courts excluded evidence in 24% of
cases where a violation was found.2 28 In Belgium, though no empirical
study is available, observers have noted that as a result of a shift toward
balancing that started in 2003, unlawfully obtained evidence is "rarely
226 See, e.g., Arenson, supra note 196, at 20, 35 (noting that the severity of the crime
influenced decisions on exclusion, even though it was not a factor formally considered under
the doctrine); Blum, supra note 218, at 389-90; Andrew L.T. Choo & Susan Nash,
Improperly Obtained Evidence in the Commonwealth: Lessons for England and Wales?, 11
INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 75, 104 (2007) (noting the importance of a "rights culture" to the
effectiveness of an exclusionary rule); Brain Presser, Research Note, Public Policy, Police
Interest: A Re-Evaluation of the Judicial Discretion to Exclude Improperly or Illegally
Obtained Evidence, 25 MELB. U. L. REv. 757 (2001).
227 Blum, supra note 218, at 402-04; E-mail from Binyamin Blum, Faculty of Law,
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, to Jenia Turner, Professor, SMU Dedman School of Law
(Dec. 8, 2014, 10:56 CST) (on file with author). Blum argues that this very low suppression
rate cannot be attributed entirely to the structure of the balancing test, which closely
resembles the test used by Canadian courts. Instead, the low exclusion rate reflects the Israeli
judiciary's outcome-driven approach to procedure and a broader "security agenda" that
influences attitudes towards the regulation of police in Israel. Blum, supra note 218, at 435-
44.
228 Presser, supra note 226, at 776 (finding that courts excluded evidence in six out of
twenty-five cases in which the court found that the police had violated the law).
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excluded." 22 9
While these numbers may suggest that discretionary exclusionary rules
tend to be rather feeble, data from Canada point in the other direction. In
several studies, researchers have found that Canadian courts exclude
evidence in about 70% of cases in which a constitutional violation is
found.2 30 The evidence from Canada thus suggests that a balancing
approach need not undermine the exclusionary rule; even under a
discretionary rule, courts might still exclude evidence in a significant
number of cases where a violation is found to have occurred. This is all the
more likely in countries like Canada and the United States, where restraints
on police powers are grounded in a Constitution, rather than in statutes. 231
In the end, comparative data on exclusion rates do not answer other
questions that are critical for assessing the effects of the exclusionary rule:
Does a balancing approach discourage defendants from bringing challenges
to unlawful searches and seizures? 232 And conversely, are courts more
likely to interpret the law on search and seizure more generously if they are
no longer concerned about a rigid and inflexible exclusionary rule?233 While
both possibilities have been raised by scholars writing about foreign
balancing rules, there is-as yet-no clear empirical answer.2 34 Likewise,
229
Meese, supra note 187, at 65; see also Jan Fremon et al., The Investigative Stage of
the Criminal Process in Belgium, in SUSPECTS iN EUROPE 29, 54 (Ed Cape et al. eds., 2007)
(noting that "illegal actions by investigators will normally not lead to exclusion of the
evidence obtained as a consequence of their action").
230 Ariane Asselin, Trends for Exclusion of Evidence in 2012, 1 C.R. (7th) 74 (2013)(finding 73% rate of exclusion at the trial level); Mike Madden, Marshalling the Data: An
Empirical Analysis of Canada's Section 24(2) Case Law in the Wake of R. v. Grant, 15 CAN.
CRIM. L. REv. 229, 237 (2011) (noting a roughly 70% rate of exclusion under the more
concrete Canadian balancing test after R. v. Grant); Thierry Nadon, Le paragraphe 24(2) de
la Charte au Qubbec depuis Grant: si la tendance se maintient!, 86 C.R. (6th) 33, 42 (2011)
(finding a 64% post-Grant exclusion rate in Quebec).
231 Stribopoulos, supra note 172, at 81.
232 For a concern that this may have occurred in Canada, see, for example, Stephen G.
Coughlan, Good Faith and Exclusion ofEvidence Under the Charter, 11 C.R. (4th) 304, 312
(1992); Hauschildt, supra note 216, at 525.
233 Stribopoulos, supra note 172, at 132-33, 136.
234 Stribopoulos suggests that "[t]he Supreme Court of Canada has consistently taken a
more expansive view than the United States Supreme Court on the type of police behavior
that constitutes an intrusion upon reasonable expectations of privacy warranting
constitutional protection." Id. at 133. He attributes this more generous interpretation of
privacy provisions at least in part to the discretionary exclusionary rule in Canada. Id. At the
same time, a number of countries with discretionary exclusionary rules have privacy
protections that are at least in some respects narrower than those afforded by Fourth
Amendment case law in the United States. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 184, at 286-87.
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no comparative study has analyzed the effects of a discretionary
exclusionary rule on police compliance with constitutional rules.
The comparative analysis does point to another potential advantage of
balancing, however. The balancing approach has led a number of foreign
systems to experiment with a sliding scale of remedies for procedural
violations. When a violation is minor or made in good faith, for example,
many foreign courts may decide to grant the defendant a sentence reduction
or to instruct the jury about the violation, rather than to exclude the
evidence. 2 3 5 This minimizes the negative effect of the remedy on truth-
seeking while still arguably advancing the goals of protecting individual
rights and preserving the integrity of the judicial system. While American
commentators have debated the vices and virtues of sentencing reductions
as an alternative or complement to the exclusionary rule,236 the U.S.
Supreme Court-despite its embrace of balancing-has not seriously
considered alternatives to exclusion within the criminal process. 23 7 If the
Court were to openly embrace a balancing approach, it should also
reconsider the range of remedies available in criminal cases for violations
of Fourth Amendment rights.238
In short, comparative analysis helps us appreciate better both the
advantages and disadvantages of a shift to balancing. While empirical data
on the practical effects of balancing is mixed, the Canadian experience
suggests that a balancing approach need not eviscerate the exclusionary
rule. Balancing may even bring some beneficial effects, broadening the
range of available remedies and expanding the court's ability to exclude
The scope and content of these rights is likely shaped by too many factors to permit a valid
comparative empirical study about the effects of the exclusionary rule.
235 See, e.g., BUTLER & BUTLER, supra note 192, at 1037 § 29.6.5 (2005). On sentence
reductions, see, for example, Borgers & Stevens, supra note 187, at 190; Chraidi v.
Germany, 47 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2, 53 (2006). In Canada, sentence reductions are used in lieu of
exclusion only rarely. See R. v. Nasogaluak (2007), 229 C.C.C. (3d) 52 (Alta. C.A.). On
English courts' use of jury instructions in lieu of exclusion, see Andrew Choo, supra note
186, at 343-47.
236 Compare Calabresi, supra note 20, at 115-17, and Caldwell & Chase, supra note
174, at 73-74, with Yale Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule,
26 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 136 (2003); David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based
Policing Can Reinforce-Or Replace-The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 201-03 (2009).
237 The Court has, however, referred to the supposed availability of civil remedies and
internal discipline as a reason to curtail the exclusionary rule. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S.
586, 597-99 (2006).
238 Cf Calabresi, supra note 20, at 115-17 (proposing sentence reductions as an
alternative to the exclusionary rule); Caldwell & Chase, supra note 174, at 73-74 (same).
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evidence in order to discourage evidence laundering and other instances of
police carelessness. Despite these potential benefits, as our courts move
more closely to a discretionary approach to exclusion, they must also
remain alert to its significant downsides-inconsistency, unpredictability,
and a potentially weaker deterrence effect.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis of published court decisions between 2009 and 2014
suggests that Herring delivered exactly what it promised (or threatened).
The fault-based doctrinal test in Herring, which focuses on an individual
officer's state of mind, creates serious blind spots for the courts,
particularly in situations where more than one officer is involved in the
investigation. The published opinions do not inquire deeply into the ways
that many small mistakes can accumulate into unreliable systems,
particularly in the context of law enforcement databases. As a result, the
good faith doctrine now operates entirely apart from police realities.
Deterrence of police misconduct is not a realistic objective for a doctrine
that ignores how law enforcement organizations shape the conduct of
individual officers. The outcome in a good faith case represents the trial
court's view of individual, transactional justice, rather than a reality-based
strategy to promote lawful policing. Too often the result is evidence
laundering.
Herring and its progeny have further entrenched the balancing test for
excluding evidence, weighing the benefits of deterring police misconduct
against the costs of excluding probative evidence. This embrace of
balancing, and the related interest in the level of police culpability, brings
American courts closer to their counterparts in other common-law systems
and a number of European civil-law systems. We therefore can look to
foreign systems for insights about how the exclusionary rule in the United
States might progress.
Comparisons to other systems offer conflicting evidence on the effects
of the modified exclusionary rule on litigation outcomes. In some countries,
a softer version of the exclusionary remedy results in many government
victories; in others, the litigation impact is less dramatic. It is too early to
know the effects that the shift to balancing might have on the effectiveness
of the U.S. exclusionary rule or on the breadth of Fourth Amendment
doctrine, but if this is the direction we are heading, we ought to be having a
parallel conversation about increasing the range of remedies inside the
criminal case for constitutional violations that, on balance, deserve some
recognition but do not merit exclusion.
Our comparative analysis also suggests some concerns about the
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malleability of the balancing test and about the possibility that a low rate of
success may discourage defendants from bringing suppression motions in
the first place. What is clear, however, is that as our exclusionary rule
increasingly resembles the remedial rules of other major legal systems,
comparative conversations become more relevant. What once seemed far
removed now hits close to home.
